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STRUCTURAL OVERDELEGATION IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ANTHONY O’ROURKE *
In function, if not in form, criminal procedure is a type of delegation.
It requires courts to select constitutional objectives and to decide how much
discretionary authority to allocate to law enforcement officials in order to
implement those objectives. By recognizing this process for what it is, this
Article identifies a previously unseen phenomenon that inheres in the
structure of criminal procedure decisionmaking.
Criminal procedure’s decisionmaking structure pressures the Supreme
Court to delegate more discretionary authority to law enforcement officials
than the Court’s constitutional objectives can justify. By definition, this
systematic “overdelegation” does not result from the Supreme Court’s
hostility to protecting criminal procedure rights. Instead, it arises from a
set of institutional pressures that, in combination, differentiate criminal
procedure from other forms of constitutional decisionmaking.
By identifying the problem of structural overdelegation, this Article
clears away much of the confusion that complicates normative debates
about the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure decisions. Why does the
Supreme Court so frequently grant discretionary authority to law
enforcement institutions that other observers find untrustworthy? How can
one tell whether the Court has granted “too much” discretion to law
enforcement officials, and what does that phrase even mean? By turning
attention to criminal procedure’s structure, this Article offers a framework
for answering these questions, and for deepening our understanding of
criminal procedure decisionmaking.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has eliminated the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule as a remedy for negligent policing, 1 allowed
officers to resume questioning suspects (including incarcerated suspects)
fourteen days after they invoke their Miranda rights, 2 given trial courts
broad latitude to admit statements by mortally wounded witnesses under the
“ongoing emergency” exception to the Confrontation Clause, 3 and declined
to regulate the use of unreliable eyewitness testimony under circumstances
where the police were not responsible for rendering it unreliable.4 In each
of these cases, the Court had to choose between imposing constitutional
1
2
3
4

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010).
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012).

2013]

STRUCTURAL OVERDELEGATION

409

constraints on law enforcement officials and granting them the discretionary
authority to go about their business without risking judicial sanction. And,
in each of these cases (and many others), the Court chose discretion.5
Why does the Supreme Court so often make this choice in criminal
procedure cases? Is the choice “correct” with respect to whatever
constitutional objective the Court is trying to achieve in a given case? If
not, what can be done about it? This Article provides a framework that
shows how deeply these questions are interrelated and suggests how they
may be answered.
Specifically, this Article draws on scholarship from the social sciences
and administrative law to defend two novel claims about the nature of
criminal procedure decisionmaking. The first is that in function, if not in
form, constitutional criminal procedure is a type of delegation.6 When
deciding a criminal procedure case, a court must select some constitutional
objective, such as ensuring that officials comply with what the court
determines to be their obligations under the Fourth Amendment without
threatening their ability to engage in effective law enforcement. Having
selected this objective, however, the court must then act as a regulator and
craft a set of doctrinal rules designed to ensure that law enforcement
officials will implement the constitutional objective. 7 Through these rules,
the court creates what administrative law scholars call a “policy space”
within which law enforcement officials have the discretion either to comply
with the court’s constitutional objective or to deviate from it. 8 Just as
5

Indeed, a persistent theme in the constitutional criminal procedure literature has been
the Court’s failure to meaningfully constrain this discretion. Significant recent contributions
to this massive literature include Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court fails to adequately
enforce constitutional separation of powers provisions designed to limit prosecutorial
discretion); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 781 (2006) (arguing that constitutional criminal procedure doctrine affords virtually
unlimited discretion to police and prosecutors).
6
See infra Part I. This Article is the first to systematically examine the ways in which
constitutional criminal procedure resembles traditional forms of delegation. One scholar,
Michael Klarman, has observed that modern constitutional criminal procedure is consistent
with, and perhaps tacitly motivated by, “a strong nondelegation doctrine” that is intended to
limit legislators’ ability to shift decisionmaking out of the hands of politically unaccountable
law enforcement officials. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 763–68 (1991).
7
Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 4 (1984) (“The Supreme Court is a regulator.”).
8
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2599 (2006) (describing congressional delegations of power to
administrative agencies as creating “policy spaces” that agencies have the discretion to
operate within).
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Congress can choose the amount of discretionary authority it delegates to
administrative agencies by drafting legislation broadly or narrowly, a court
may choose how much discretionary authority to delegate to law
enforcement institutions by crafting permissive or restrictive doctrinal
rules. 9
By recognizing this process for what it is—delegation—one can clear
away a great deal of normative confusion about the Supreme Court’s
doctrinal choices.
Scholars frequently criticize criminal procedure
decisions for granting “too much” discretion to law enforcement officials.10
Rarely, however, do they differentiate between condemning the Court for
choosing a constitutional objective that fails to impose meaningful
obligations on law enforcement officials and criticizing the Court for
choosing doctrinal rules that fail to implement its constitutional objective.
By contrast, congressional delegation theorists are careful to draw a
distinction between examining whether Congress has selected a laudable
policy objective and evaluating whether it has chosen a delegation strategy
likely to achieve that objective. 11
Building on this distinction, the second claim of this Article is that
criminal procedure’s decisionmaking structure creates pressure on the
Supreme Court to delegate more discretionary authority to law enforcement
institutions than can be justified by the Court’s constitutional objectives.
From police officers conducting investigations and arrests, to prosecutors
and trial judges overseeing convictions, and to defense attorneys fighting
those convictions, constitutional criminal procedure governs a diverse array
of actors and activities within the criminal justice system. Notwithstanding
this diversity, however, constitutional criminal procedure rights share a
common decisionmaking structure that sets the rights apart from others in
constitutional law.
In other contexts, political theorists such as Mark Graber and Keith
Whittington have examined structural dynamics that lead other institutional
actors to bolster the Supreme Court’s authority over constitutional
9

See infra Part I.
E.g., Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 247, 252–
53 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “grants
extraordinary discretion to police and prosecutors”).
11
See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 52–
85 (1999) (presenting a game theoretic model of Congress’s equilibrium strategy for
delegating power to an executive agency); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of
Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1049–57 (2006) (modeling how Congress selects between agencies
when delegating power).
10
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interpretation. 12 Few scholars, however, have explored the structural
conditions that may lead the Court to divest itself of authority in certain
areas of law. This Article presents such an analysis, identifying a number
of structural features that collectively distinguish criminal procedure
adjudication from other forms of constitutional lawmaking and examining
how these features pressure the Court to systematically delegate more
power to law enforcement institutions than is warranted by the Court’s
constitutional objectives. It also addresses why the Court sometimes
refrains from committing this error of overdelegation and examines how the
Justices might modify their decisionmaking processes to create a better fit
between their delegation choices and their constitutional aims.
As it is defined here, there are two ways in which a court is likely to
commit the error of overdelegation. First, a court may overestimate the
extent to which law enforcement officials require discretionary authority in
order to implement a constitutional objective effectively under conditions of
uncertainty. Specifically, the court may overestimate the likelihood that,
for reasons it cannot know in advance, officials will be unable to comply
with a doctrinal rule without sacrificing other important values such as
safety or effective law enforcement, and would thus need to deviate from
the rule in order to achieve the policy outcome the court intended. 13
Second, the court may underestimate the extent to which law enforcement
officials are unable or unwilling to implement a constitutional objective,
and might therefore use the discretion they are accorded to undermine the
objective. 14
So defined, a judge does not overdelegate when she feels obligated as
a matter of constitutional interpretation to preserve the discretionary
authority of law enforcement officials. Instead, overdelegation typically
occurs when judges entrust decisions regarding the implementation of some
constitutional goal to other institutions without engaging in a sound
comparative analysis of whether those institutions are better positioned than
the court to make these decisions. Consider the Supreme Court’s decision
in Herring v. United States to eliminate the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for Fourth Amendment violations involving ordinary negligence by police
12

See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY, at xi,
xii (2007) (examining political competition between the executive and judiciary, and arguing
that the executive is sometimes incentivized to bolster the Supreme Court’s claim of judicial
supremacy); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 37 (1993) (exploring institutional incentives for
legislators to invite the Supreme Court to intervene on policy questions).
13
See infra Part II.A.1.
14
See infra Part II.A.2.
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officers. 15 The Court asserted that it was not seeking to alter the scope of
suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights, and that the controlling question in the
case was whether the exclusionary rule effectively deters violations of those
rights. 16 If one were to accept these assertions at face value, then this
inquiry should have involved a comparative analysis of whether the
judiciary needed to involve itself in guarding against negligent Fourth
Amendment violations, or whether this responsibility could be delegated to
law enforcement officials. Such a comparative assessment would have
required the Court to weigh (1) the deterrent value and social costs of the
exclusionary rule and alternative Fourth Amendment remedies (such as
civil liability) against (2) the training practices and cultural behaviors of
local police departments.17
In practice, however, the Court appears to have narrowed the
exclusionary rule, and thus delegated considerable discretionary authority to
law enforcement officials, without adequately weighing these factors. First,
with respect to the exclusionary rule’s deterrence value, the Court asserted
that the rule provided only “marginal deterrence” in cases of ordinary
negligence, but offered neither theoretical nor empirical support for this
proposition. 18 Regarding the exclusionary rule’s social costs, the Court
simply asserted the qualitative nature of the rule’s harm—“letting guilty
and possibly dangerous defendants go free” 19—but did not attempt to
provide any sort of quantitative estimate of this harm. 20 Second, the Court
did not consider how eliminating the exclusionary rule might affect the
incentives and motivations of police departments to develop policies that
ensure constitutional compliance in the absence of a strong remedial rule.
15

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
Id. at 141.
17
Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this comparative institutional
approach by adopting an exclusionary rule intended to address systemic institutional
misconduct rather than individual misfeasance. See id. at 146 (“In a case where systemic
errors were demonstrated, it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant
system.”); see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Essay, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 684–85 (2011) (discussing the
Court’s “systemic error” standard and observing that “no case prior to Herring had held that
systemic Fourth Amendment misconduct could provide the basis for a motion to suppress”);
id. at 738 (“Herring suggests the possibility of a world in which suppression hearings adduce
evidence of departmental policies and training, or systemic patterns in law enforcement
tactics . . . .”).
18
Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48.
19
Id. at 141.
20
In the absence of reliable empirical data on whether the exclusionary rule resulted in
the release of a significant number of guilty defendants, the Court could have provided a
theoretical argument for why it might expect this number to be high, but did not do so.
16
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Instead, the Court appears to have been moved by the specter of “guilty and
possibly dangerous defendants going free” to delegate power to law
enforcement officials without undertaking a more thorough comparative
institutional analysis of whether that delegation most effectively advances
its constitutional objectives.
This analysis of overdelegation in Herring illustrates two significant
contributions this Article makes to the current understanding of
constitutional criminal procedure. First, it challenges the common
assumption that criminal procedure decisions can be explained exclusively
in terms of the political preferences of the Supreme Court’s members.
While this “attitudinal” model of Supreme Court decisionmaking has
considerable value in terms of predicting the outcomes of cases,21 it does
not purport to explain why the Justices might settle on a particular doctrinal
strategy for achieving their objectives. 22 By using the concept of
overdelegation to evaluate the Court’s decision in Herring, one might
develop a more sophisticated, and ultimately more illuminating, account of
why the Court is hostile to the exclusionary rule and how the structural
features of criminal procedure decisionmaking shape Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
For example, some argue that the Court has set up a deterrence
rationale in its Fourth Amendment cases that enables it to avoid the sort of
comparative analysis that a rational delegation strategy requires. If there is
no evidence of deterrence, the Court can claim that the exclusionary rule is
not necessary; if there is evidence of deterrence, the Court can claim that
the exclusionary rule has too high a cost in terms of overdeterring police
from pursuing guilty defendants. 23 Such a doctrinal strategy suggests that
the Court’s hostility may not be directed toward the nature of Fourth
Amendment rights, but to the sort of comparative institutional analysis that
is required to safeguard those rights. Thus, by framing our analysis in terms
of overdelegation, we can turn our attention to the structural features of
criminal procedure decisionmaking that might explain its broader doctrinal
21
See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 312–56 (2002) (describing the predictive validity of
ideology with respect to Supreme Court Justices’ votes).
22
See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 517, 523–28 (2006) (explaining the attitudinal model’s limitations with respect to
understanding the ideological valence of specific doctrinal choices); Barry Friedman, Taking
Law Seriously 266–68 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 06-08, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
06-19, 2006) (discussing the limitations of evaluating judicial ideology on the basis of case
outcomes rather than on the content of legal opinions).
23
See Laurin, supra note 17, at 708–09.
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trajectory.
This Article’s second significant contribution is to demonstrate that,
while criminal procedure cannot be adequately explained as mere politics, it
is also unlikely to reflect any doctrinally rational set of decisionmaking
choices. Professor Orin Kerr, for example, has recently argued that the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be explained by an
“equilibrium theory,” whereby the Court calibrates its doctrinal choices so
that the Fourth Amendment offers the same level of protection in the wake
This Article’s account of
of technological and social changes. 24
overdelegation suggests, however, that the structure of criminal procedure
decisionmaking will make it particularly difficult to sustain such a doctrinal
equilibrium over time, and thus calls Professor Kerr’s hypothesis into
question.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I defends the premise that it is
constructive to talk about criminal procedure decisionmaking as a
delegation process. Part II defines the concept of overdelegation and
addresses some of the benefits (and limitations) of employing such a
carefully circumscribed definition. Part III then identifies a number of
structural features of criminal procedure decisionmaking that may give rise
to overdelegation. To the extent that this analysis of overdelegation is
successful, it gives rise to the question of why the Supreme Court
sometimes chooses not to delegate excessive discretion to law enforcement
officials. Part IV takes on this question and draws on institutional choice
theory to suggest why the Court might cycle between creating criminal
procedure rules that greatly circumscribe the discretion of law enforcement
officials and rules that overdelegate such discretion.
This Article’s account of structural overdelegation in criminal
procedure suggests that, absent radical structural reform to criminal
procedure decisionmaking, criminal procedure doctrine will inevitably fail
to implement adequately whatever constitutional guarantees the Supreme
Court imagines itself to be protecting. This Article is thus intended as a
prolegomenon to a more ambitious rethinking of the judiciary’s appropriate
role in safeguarding the Constitution’s criminal procedure guarantees.
However, while radical reform might be necessary to completely solve the
problem of overdelegation, individual judges may be able to ameliorate the
problem through modest changes in their decisionmaking processes. In the
interest of developing such partial, but practical, solutions, Part V offers
decisionmaking suggestions that may help judges create doctrinal rules that
24

Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 539–42 (2011).

2013]

STRUCTURAL OVERDELEGATION

415

delegate an optimal level of discretion to law enforcement officers with
respect to the judges’ constitutional objectives.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DELEGATION STRATEGY
This Article uses the term “overdelegation” to describe a type of
judicial decisionmaking error, and this coinage presents two significant
challenges which this Part addresses. Specifically, when inventing a new
term to criticize judicial decisions, there is an intellectual obligation to
demonstrate that it serves as more than a rhetorical device for describing
decisions that one dislikes. This challenge is particularly serious when, as
here, one is using a familiar term (“delegation”) in an unfamiliar way.
Second, in describing a criminal procedure as a delegation process, one
must clarify what it is the Supreme Court is delegating to law enforcement
officials and show why it is consistent with our doctrinal understanding of
the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary.
A. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AS DELEGATION

To accuse the Supreme Court of overdelegation in criminal procedure
is to beg the question whether criminal procedure decisionmaking involves
any type of delegation at all. Addressing this question requires a synthesis
of two separate and vast areas of scholarship. In one area of the literature,
administrative law scholars and political scientists have done much work on
the concept of delegation. However, this scholarship largely concerns
congressional delegations of power to administrative agencies, 25 and it is
not immediately obvious how it relates to criminal procedure. In the other,
criminal procedure scholars routinely examine the extent to which the
Supreme Court’s doctrinal choices afford discretion to police and
prosecutors. 26 Rarely, however, do they frame these choices as a delegation
of power to law enforcement officials. 27 To date, there appears to be no
25
See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency
Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 600–04 (1989); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran,
The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 961–67 (1999); Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of
Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND.
L. REV. 363, 364 n.3 (2010); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 100 (1985); David B. Spence, A Public
Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2002); David B. Spence &
Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 101–02
(2000).
26
See supra note 5.
27
One notable exception is Michael Klarman’s account of modern constitutional
criminal procedure as consistent with, and perhaps tacitly motivated by, “a strong
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detailed examination of the ways in which criminal procedure
decisionmaking resembles the process of congressional delegation, or why
this resemblance might be theoretically interesting. 28 This section supplies
such an examination.
To begin with the obvious, constitutional criminal procedure consists
of judicially enforced individual rights that constrain law enforcement
officials. Unless a court intervenes to regulate an area of criminal
procedure, it is largely left to the discretion of police departments and
prosecutors’ offices whether to respect a criminal procedure right and how
to formulate its policies with regard to the right. 29 When a court crafts a
doctrine that safeguards a criminal procedure right, it narrows these law
enforcement officials’ discretionary authority, and in equal measure it
asserts the judiciary’s constitutional authority to regulate the processes of
arrest and criminal prosecution. 30 Building from this account, one can
frame constitutional criminal procedure doctrine as a means not only for
taking discretionary authority away from law enforcement officials, but also
for delegating it back to them piecemeal.
This is best illustrated by drawing on the congressional delegation
nondelegation doctrine” that limits the ability of legislatures to shift decisionmaking out of
the hands of politically unaccountable law enforcement officials. See Klarman, supra note 6,
at 763–68.
28
There is, by contrast, a rich body of criminal law scholarship examining the causes and
consequences involved in how legislatures choose to delegate power to police and law
enforcement officials. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 5; Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant
to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 480 (1996); Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV.
757, 777 (1999). Relatedly, there are many analyses of how much deference courts owe to
these legislative delegation choices as a matter of normative constitutional theory. Compare
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure,
86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (arguing for deference), with David Cole, Foreword: Discretion
and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87
GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999) (arguing against deference).
29
This assumes, of course, that legislatures typically choose not to regulate law
enforcement officials with respect to criminal procedure policies—an assumption that is
supported by the history of modern criminal procedure. See Klarman, supra note 6, at 765
(observing that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution occurred in a political
context in which legislatures “happily delegated” the task of formulating criminal procedure
policy “to the unfettered discretion of politically unaccountable law enforcement officials”);
cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 827–37 (2004) (arguing that Congress has a
history of successfully protecting Fourth Amendment rights that are threatened by new
technologies).
30
See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 6, at 764–65 (arguing that modern constitutional
criminal procedure developed in order for the judiciary to take away power from politically
unaccountable law enforcement officials that had been delegated to them by legislatures).
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literature to identify similarities between the judicial process of crafting a
criminal procedure rule and the legislative process by which Congress
decides whether to delegate power to administrative agencies. For
Congress, the choice whether to delegate discretionary authority arises
during statutory drafting. The purpose of enacting a statute, this literature
assumes, is to achieve some policy outcome that Congress desires. 31 In
order to achieve this policy outcome—and perhaps to do so in a way that
gives legislators credit for politically popular choices, shifts blame for
politically unpopular ones, or advances some other secondary goal—
Congress may draft a statute that provides little guidance as to how the
policy should be implemented and vests an agency with broad discretionary
authority to give effect to the policy. 32 As long as the statute supplies an
“intelligible principle” to which the agency is “directed to conform,” it is a
constitutionally permissible delegation of power to the executive branch.33
Conversely, by drafting extremely detailed legislation, Congress may grant
officials little to no leeway to take a course of action that it did not specify.
And by drafting with a level of precision that falls somewhere between
these extremes, Congress can grant officials enough discretion to pursue the
statute’s policy objectives efficiently while exercising enough oversight of
the officials to guard against bureaucratic drift.34 Political scientists have
represented these choices as a set of continuous strategies (ranging from no
delegation to complete delegation) from which Congress can choose in
order to best approximate its ideal policy outcome, shift blame for
unpopular choices, or advance some other goal it wishes to pursue. 35
Accordingly, determining the appropriate level of discretion to delegate is a
context-sensitive question that will depend on the nature of the policy
problem and on the competence and likely policy preferences of agency
officials. 36
31
More precisely, much of the literature analyzes the most preferred policy of the
median floor voter in Congress. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 54–55.
32
See id. at 32–33 (summarizing the blame-shifting model of congressional delegation
and discussing its limitations).
33
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (describing the
constitutional requirement imposed by the nondelegation doctrine); accord Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (invoking the “intelligible principle” standard in
applying the congressional nondelegation doctrine).
34
See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 7–8.
35
See, e.g., id. at 53–75; Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 97–108 (2008) (modeling a continuous delegation
game).
36
See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 52–85; see also Lemos, supra note 25,
at 372–78 (summarizing the administrative law scholarship on the reasons why Congress
delegates to agencies).
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This congressional delegation process closely resembles the
adjudicative process by which courts construct criminal procedure rules. In
the adjudicative process, the criminal procedure right that a court wishes to
enforce serves as the equivalent of a policy objective that Congress seeks to
implement through drafting legislation. In order to implement the right, a
court must craft doctrinal rules that govern the conduct of law enforcement
officials, and determine how significantly it wishes to limit, or expand, the
officials’ discretion about how best to implement the right—or whether to
implement the right at all. 37 This requires courts to identify a constitutional
objective, and craft a doctrine that either limits or expands the discretionary
authority of law enforcement officials, based on which choice is more likely
to achieve the court’s objective.38 Thus, while the task of expounding the
Constitution’s meaning might remain squarely within the province of the
judiciary, courts must necessarily devolve the task of implementing that
meaning to nonjudicial officials. And, in deciding how best to implement a
particular constitutional criminal procedure objective, the court must decide
how much discretionary authority to delegate to law enforcement officials.
One might object that, by calling this adjudicative process
“delegation,” one is simply using a new term to describe a familiar process
of constitutional lawmaking.
Constitutional adjudication frequently
requires courts to interpret the meaning of underdetermined texts, and thus
involves precedent-based judicial lawmaking. 39 Therefore, in resolving a
constitutional question, courts will frequently announce a vague
constitutional principle and allow that principle to evolve in meaning as
further constitutional challenges arise. In practice, this process gives
nonjudicial actors considerable power to influence how constitutional
principles are shaped. 40 In Establishment Clause cases, for example, the
37

See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2000) (defining
discretion in the context of criminal justice as the “power to choose between two or more
courses of conduct”); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1969) (“A public officer has discretion whenever the effective
limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or
inaction.”).
38
See Luna, supra note 37, at 1140.
39
See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996).
40
In addition to fleshing out the meaning of constitutional principles in subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court may also invite nonjudicial institutions to help give meaning to
constitutional principles through their own regulatory processes. For example, in the Court’s
recent ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence, it has announced with ever-increasing
clarity that it will look to “codified standards of professional practice,” including American
Bar Association Guidelines, in determining whether a defense attorney’s performance falls
below a constitutionally acceptable baseline. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012)
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Court may lay out some loosely defined boundaries between government
displays of religious imagery that are constitutionally permissible, and those
that cross a line. 41 However, because the Supreme Court intervenes only
rarely to evaluate the constitutionality of such displays, it will largely be left
to nonjudicial officials to give effect to the Court’s announced principles
when determining whether a particular government display is constitutional.
This process of constitutional development—in which the Constitution’s
meaning evolves through case law, and nonjudicial officials play a role in
shaping that meaning—is not unique to criminal procedure, and it would
add little value to use a new theoretical vocabulary to describe this process.
This Article does not, however, use the term “delegation” to describe
the process by which constitutional meaning evolves. Instead, this Article
treats the Supreme Court’s understanding of any particular constitutional
objective as exogenous and uses delegation to describe the way that the
Court goes about implementing its objective. The act of judicial delegation
is not, therefore, something that this Article applauds or condemns as such.
Instead, the question of how much power the Court should delegate to law
enforcement officials in a given situation will vary depending on the
Court’s constitutional objective.
To appreciate the distinction between “delegation” and ordinary
constitutional lawmaking, it is theoretically useful to appeal, as other
(holding that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense attorneys to inform their
clients of plea bargaining offers that are favorable to them). But see Bobby v. Van Hook,
130 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that ABA guidelines have no
“special relevance in determining whether an attorney’s performance meets the standard
required by the Sixth Amendment”). In recent ineffective assistance cases, moreover, the
Court has announced only open-ended constitutional principles, which it will presumably
later clarify with assistance from the ABA and other professional organizations. In Padilla
v. Kentucky, for example, the Court held in broad terms that the 6th Amendment right to
counsel requires criminal defense attorneys to inform their clients of the potential
“deportation consequences” of accepting a plea bargain where those consequences are “truly
clear” as a matter of law. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010); see also id. at 1487 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the majority for adopting a “vague, halfway test” that will “lead to
much confusion and needless litigation”). By combining this broad principle with an
expressed willingness to look to “prevailing professional norms” to establish the scope of an
attorney’s constitutional obligations during plea bargaining, id. at 1482–83 (majority
opinion), the Court sends a clear signal that nonjudicial officials will play a role in clarifying
its ineffective assistance jurisprudence. One might argue that this pluralistic lawmaking
process can also be characterized as delegation. Doing so, however, would collapse the
distinction this Article makes between ordinary constitutional lawmaking and the regulatory
process that occurs in criminal procedure cases.
41
Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (upholding Texas State
Capitol’s display of the Ten Commandments based on the context and history of the
monument), with McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 865 (2005)
(invalidating courthouse display of the Ten Commandments).
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scholars have, to the “decision rules” taxonomy for constitutional
adjudication, which separates constitutional doctrine into three analytically
distinct categories. 42 First, the Supreme Court must interpret the meaning
of a specific constitutional guarantee (or what Mitch Berman calls a
“constitutional operative proposition”). 43 Second, in order to implement
that constitutional guarantee, the Court must construct a “decision rule” that
directs courts on how to decide whether a constitutional guarantee has been
satisfied, and thereby instructs officials as to what is required of them in
order to avoid the risk of judicial sanction. 44 Third, the Court must
construct a “remedial rule,” which specifies the consequences that courts
should impose if they determine (by applying the decision rule) that the
Constitution has been violated. 45
As it pertains to constitutional criminal procedure, this taxonomy
highlights the ways in which the judicial crafting of constitutional remedies
resembles the process of congressional delegation. In evaluating a criminal
procedure case, one could offer a normative critique of how the Court
interprets a constitutional operative proposition or—as this Article does—
one may instead examine how a court decides to implement that
proposition. Just as Congress must choose the delegation strategy that will
best achieve its ideal policy outcome, the Court must choose an
implementation strategy that is likely to minimize adjudicatory errors and
ensure compliance with the constitutional guarantee in question.46 A
constitutional decision rule may closely track the operative proposition, but
it may also substantially differ from it. The decision rule may, for example,
overenforce a constitutional guarantee by requiring officials to do more than
the Constitution requires of them in order to avoid the risk of judicial
liability. 47 Or, the Court may create a decision rule that underenforces the
42

For a recent application of the decision rules model to Herring v. United States, see
Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1022–29 (2010). Important theoretical
contributions to the decision rules model—all of which draw upon criminal procedure cases
for examples—include Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1
(2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Kermit Roosevelt, III, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1656
(2005); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
43
Berman, supra note 42, at 9–10.
44
Id. at 10–12.
45
Id. at 12.
46
See id. at 93–94 (addressing normatively legitimate aims of decision rules).
47
See Monaghan, supra note 42, at 13–26.
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constitutional guarantee, with the expectation (or hope) that other actors
will nevertheless fulfill their constitutional obligations. 48 Similarly, when
deciding upon the appropriate remedial rule, the Court must decide how
best to optimize compliance with the constitutional operative proposition
under the conditions that exist in the world, and these conditions may
require it to design a rule that is more or less intrusive than it would decide
is optimal under ideal circumstances. Whether the Court chooses a decision
rule that over- or underenforces a constitutional guarantee will depend on
considerations such as its institutional competence, the costs of imposing an
overinclusive decision rule, and the frequency with which the underlying
constitutional guarantee would be violated absent a strong decision rule. 49
The decision of how to craft a criminal procedure rule tailored to a
constitutional objective thus resembles the way in which Congress chooses
a delegation strategy to achieve an optimal policy outcome. By crafting a
restrictive decision rule (which would impose heavy restrictions on how
law enforcement officials conduct their affairs) or a strong remedial rule
(which would impose a severe sanction for deviations from that conduct),
the Court could retain considerable authority over criminal procedure
regulation. By crafting a permissive decision rule (with few restrictions on
law enforcement officials) or a weak remedial rule (that imposes light
penalties for impermissible conduct), the Court could delegate considerable
discretionary authority to law enforcement officials. And by crafting a
decision rule and remedial rule between these extremes, the Court could
retain some intermediate level of oversight over the conduct of law
enforcement officials. In other words, just as Congress must do when
drafting legislation, the Supreme Court must select from a (potentially
uncountable) set of options for limiting or expanding its oversight over law
enforcement officials when constructing a criminal procedure rule.50
Consider, for example, how the Supreme Court’s doctrinal choice in
Herring v. United States 51 may be framed as a delegation strategy for
achieving a specific constitutional objective. Conceptually, the decision
whether to apply the exclusionary rule in cases of ordinary negligence
requires a court to select the appropriate remedial rule to penalize law
enforcement officials for violating the Fourth Amendment. This presents
the Court with an institutional choice question: between courts and police
48

See Sager, supra note 42, at 1213–21.
See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1658–66.
50
Berman, supra note 42, at 12 (“As a conceptual matter, the number and variety of
options in the making of constitutional decision rules is limited only by judicial imagination
and by the (ever-changing) constraining norms of professional practice.”).
51
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
49
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departments, who is best situated to ensure that police officers comply with
the Fourth Amendment when conducting searches? If the Court were to
craft a strong exclusionary rule, its decision would undoubtedly deter some
officers from violating the Fourth Amendment on some future occasions. 52
However, the exclusionary rule’s precise deterrent value might be difficult
for the Court to discern, and preserving it may carry a high social cost in
terms of “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.” 53
Moreover, the Court may reasonably suppose that police departments
provide their officers with the training necessary to comply with the Fourth
Amendment in most situations. Assuming that police officers make an
effort to follow this training, then it acts as a substitute good for the
exclusionary rule: the better the training officers receive, the less necessary
it becomes to use the threat of the exclusionary rule to modify their
behavior. Thus, determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply in
cases of ordinary negligence will first require the Court to engage in the
normative task of identifying what sort of police conduct it wishes to deter.
Once this constitutional objective is set, the Court must then decide how
much discretionary authority it can delegate to law enforcement officials
without increasing the number of Fourth Amendment violations that are
likely to occur.
B. WHAT DO COURTS DELEGATE?

One may further object that it mischaracterizes the judicial power to
assert that the Supreme Court delegates “discretionary authority” to law
enforcement officials. Discretion, according to Kenneth Culp Davis’s
classic definition, involves the power to choose “among possible courses of
action or inaction.” 54 The discretionary authority that this Article describes
is, under this definition, effectively the power of law enforcement officials
52

Actually, not undoubtedly. If exclusionary rule skeptics are correct that civil liability
sufficiently deters Fourth Amendment violations, then theoretically the exclusionary rule
would have no added deterrent value—but also no adverse social costs. See Donald Dripps,
The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and
Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 226–
27 (2010) (“Abolition of the exclusionary rule means that the police would enjoy the full
evidentiary benefit of illegal warrantless home invasions. There are two possible scenarios.
If the specter of tort liability is strong enough, nothing will change. No extra evidence will
be discovered (and so much for the exclusionary rule’s social costs!).”); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1533 (1999) (“If the
substitute sanctions were effective in deterring the misconduct, there would not be any fruits,
and so there would be no net gain from the standpoint of accuracy in adjudication.”).
53
Herring, 555 U.S. at 141.
54
DAVIS, supra note 37, at 4.
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to decide how best to comply with a court’s constitutional objective, or
whether to comply with it at all. 55 However, as the “least dangerous”
branch, the Supreme Court must rely on executive officials to enforce its
constitutional judgments. 56 If the judicial power is thus limited to
interpreting the Constitution, and other branches of government have an
independent obligation to comply with the judiciary’s judgments, it
arguably makes little sense to say that the Supreme Court has the power to
delegate discretion not to comply with its constitutional objectives.
This objection, however, overlooks both the extent to which questions
of implementation are central to the process of constitutional lawmaking, 57
and how the Court’s implementation decisions can legitimately expand or
constrain the discretionary power of law enforcement officials. It has long
been settled that the Supreme Court’s judicial power under Article III is not
merely limited to announcing constitutional violations, but also includes the
power to construct equitable remedies for these violations. 58 Inherent in
this equitable power is the ability to construct doctrinal rules that
acknowledge the practical difficulty of ensuring that other institutions will
accept a constitutional judgment. One of the most famous exercises of this
power is the Court’s decision to delay the enforcement of its decision in
Brown v. Board of Education in the hope that the public would eventually
reconcile itself to school desegregation. 59 However, such questions of
compliance are also intrinsic to constitutional criminal procedure
decisionmaking, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis
on the importance of formulating “workable rule[s]” that can guide law
enforcement officers and be easily administered by courts. 60
Two principles follow from this understanding of the judicial power,
which together establish a parallel between criminal procedure and more
traditional forms of delegation. First, it is appropriate to characterize the
Supreme Court as having constitutional objectives that go beyond simply
55

See Luna, supra note 37, at 1134.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
57
See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
58
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on
the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003); see also Barry Friedman,
When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 740
(1992).
59
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering public schools
to desegregate “with all deliberate speed”); see also Fallon, supra note 58, at 31–32
(identifying the Court’s decision in Brown as a legacy of the judicial power as it was defined
in Marbury v. Madison).
60
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2411 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (describing the practical value of the Miranda rule).
56
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pronouncing constitutional norms. These objectives include not only
deciding what the Constitution means, but also making sure that the
decision is followed and respected.
In other words, in crafting
constitutional doctrine, the Court might be motivated, and legitimately so,
by a range of goals. These goals include, but are not limited to, minimizing
adjudicatory errors—that is, making sure that trial courts correctly identify
conduct as either constitutional or unconstitutional—and promoting
constitutional compliance among police officers. 61
Second, the doctrinal rules that courts construct to achieve their
constitutional objectives will inevitably serve either to expand or to contract
the discretionary authority of law enforcement officers to pursue their own,
often conflicting, policy objectives. Sometimes, the effect of judicial
decisions on law enforcement discretion is obvious and well recognized.
John Hart Ely, for example, famously observed that the Warren Court’s
Fourth Amendment decisions served the purpose of limiting the “low
visibility discretion” that law enforcement officers enjoyed in the absence
of any meaningful legislative or judicial oversight. 62 In other instances, the
link is less direct, but nonetheless identifiable.
In either case, however, the judicial choice either to carve out a zone of
discretionary authority, or to constrict a zone of discretionary authority, is
an act of delegation. As both administrative law and political science
scholars recognize, congressional delegations have the effect of creating a
“policy space” within which an agency has the discretionary authority to
operate.63 In criminal procedure cases, the Supreme Court creates such
spaces, giving law enforcement officials the discretion to comply with its
constitutional objectives, but also to deviate from them and pursue their
own policy objectives without having their decisions reversed or facing any
other checks on their actions.
For example, consider a Confrontation Clause case where the
delegation and discretionary authority at issue are not immediately obvious,
but are nonetheless present. In Michigan v. Bryant, 64 the Court held that the
Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of statements that a
mortally wounded witness made to police officers shortly before his death.
61

See Berman, supra note 42, at 92–96 (discussing the potential objectives of
constitutional decision rules).
62
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 97
(1980).
63
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2599; see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at
109 (formally defining discretion as the delegation of power to agencies, minus the
constraints that are placed on the exercise of that discretion).
64
See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
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The Court held that the statements were admissible under an “ongoing
emergency” exception to the Confrontation Clause, and that a police
officer’s intent in conducting an interrogation is relevant to whether this
exception applies. 65 This decision is unlikely to have any practical effect on
whether police officers will question a dying witness, and one may
therefore overlook the delegation issues that arise in Bryant if one
conceives of the constitutional objective as being to alter the investigatory
conduct of police officers.
The delegation issues may become more obvious, however, when one
bears in mind that the Confrontation Clause accords a trial right. The
Court’s constitutional objective in Bryant, then, includes minimizing
adjudicatory errors involving the admission of evidence that violates the
Confrontation Clause. Specifically, with its holding, the Court is seeking to
ensure that trial courts correctly admit all dying declarations that police
officers obtain for the purpose of preventing an ongoing emergency, while
continuing to exclude all dying declarations that were not obtained for this
purpose.
Having so framed the Court’s constitutional objective, one can see
how its doctrinal decision expanded the discretionary authority of police
and prosecutors. Specifically, the Court created what amounts to a decision
rule with its analysis of whether the trial court properly admitted the
interrogation at issue in Bryant, which was conducted twenty-five minutes
after a shooting, by five different police officers, and continued for ten
minutes. 66 Such an interrogation, the Court held, may be admitted into
evidence if the interrogators credibly represent that their purpose was to
stop an emergency. As a practical matter, this is a permissive decision rule,
and it carves out a sizeable zone of discretionary authority for police and
prosecutors. By instructing trial courts to consider the subjective
motivations of police officers in evaluating whether the Confrontation
Clause is violated, the Supreme Court gave prosecutors greater freedom to
admit statements obtained by police officers who honestly (and perhaps
correctly) believed they were conducting questioning necessary to address
an ongoing emergency. By granting this freedom, however, the Court also
gave police the opportunity to reframe their interrogation narratives in
situations where a court might be unwilling to second-guess the officers’
stories. 67 And prosecutors, who have the responsibility to present these
65

Id.
Id. at 1150, 1170.
67
See, e.g., id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of accepting a factual
narrative regarding the police interrogation that was “so transparently false that professing to
believe it demeans th[e] institution”).
66
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narratives to the trial court, were likewise given the discretion to frame an
interrogation’s purpose so that it will be rendered admissible. The Court’s
holding thus conferred upon two sets of law enforcement officials, police
and prosecutors, the discretionary authority to honor their obligations under
the Confrontation Clause (by honestly recounting the motivations behind an
interrogation), or to disregard them (by recasting those motivations in ways
that cannot easily be discredited).68
One may argue that, in Bryant, the Court did not delegate authority to
law enforcement officials, but simply chose not to punish the decision to act
contrary to the Court’s constitutional objectives. This objection gains force
from the fact that, in ordinary delegation scenarios, the agent has an explicit
fiduciary obligation to carry out the principal’s policy objectives. In order
to issue a regulation, for example, an agency must publish a “statement of
basis and purpose” that justifies how its actions relate to the purposes of the
governing statute. 69 It would thus be incorrect to characterize a transfer of
power as delegation when its sole effect is to enable an agent to traduce the
principal’s policy objectives.
However, this objection ignores important features of both
constitutional decisionmaking and the concept of delegation. First, with
respect to constitutional decisionmaking, it is of course well established that
federal judicial interpretations of the U.S. Constitution bind state law
enforcement officials. 70 Thus, when the Supreme Court announces a
constitutional objective, it gives law enforcement officials a legal obligation
and, to the extent that the officials take their constitutional oaths seriously, 71
a first-order normative obligation to comply with the objective. Decisions
like Bryant may, for whatever reason, 72 give law enforcement officials few
68
See, e.g., id. at 1173 (arguing that the Court defined an “ongoing emergency” so
expansively that it allows officers to “plausibly claim a potential threat to . . . the public”
within hours, and thus created “an expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause for
violent crimes”) (internal quotations omitted).
69
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring agencies to publish statements of basis and
purpose when issuing regulations); Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d
847, 851–52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing an agency rule because the agency did not
adequately explain why the rule served the governing statute’s objectives); see also Kevin
M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012) (arguing that courts
should interpret agency regulations in light of the purposes set forth in the accompanying
statements of basis and purpose).
70
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1958) (holding that the Supremacy Clause
requires state executive officials to comply with the Supreme Court’s constitutional rulings).
71
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution . . . .”).
72
See infra Part II.A (analyzing the reasons why courts may choose to delegate, and
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additional practical incentives to honor a constitutional objective. Such
decisions do not, however, give officials license to traduce that objective.
Second, while an act of delegation may create fiduciary responsibilities
for an agent, it also empowers the agent to disregard its responsibilities and
use the delegated authority to pursue its own objectives. Inherent in the
concept of delegated policy discretion is the power to pursue goals that the
principal did not agree upon when granting the discretion. 73 Therefore, any
act of delegation involves this risk of “bureaucratic drift,” which occurs
when an agent uses its discretionary authority to pursue policy goals that
diverge from the principal’s. 74 While the Court might not find this
bureaucratic drift desirable, or even legally permissible, it is the product of
a discretionary authority that the Court itself created through its delegation
choices.
II. OVERDELEGATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
If constitutional criminal procedure can be characterized as a set of
delegation strategies for allocating discretionary power to law enforcement
officials, it trivially follows that one can criticize some bad criminal
procedure decisions as bad delegation strategies. Such loose talk, however,
would do little more than provide a new vocabulary for condemning
judicial decisions that one finds normatively unpalatable. By contrast, this
Article presents a concept of overdelegation that highlights a structural
problem in judicial decisionmaking and is conceptually distinct from a
critique of how the court interprets any particular constitutional guarantee.
For example, imagine that two Supreme Court Justices agree that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be abolished altogether, but
write separate opinions defending this outcome. One Justice’s decision to
eliminate the exclusionary rule stems from a (potentially incorrect) belief
that police departments are better positioned than the Court to establish the
best regulatory regime for complying with their Fourth Amendment
obligations. The second Justice, however, defends his decision on
originalist grounds, arguing that the Supreme Court simply has no
constitutional authority to mandate the exclusionary rule. 75 The first
sometimes overdelegate, discretionary authority to law enforcement officials).
73
Calvert et al., supra note 25, at 589 (“Discretion consists of the departure of agency
decisions from the positions agreed upon by the executive and legislature at the time of
delegation and appointment.”).
74
See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency
Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 471 (2007) (defining bureaucratic drift).
75
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 786 (1994) (arguing that the Framers did not countenance a Fourth Amendment
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Justice’s decision potentially reflects an erroneous comparative institutional
analysis, while the second Justice’s decision does not.
In order for overdelegation to serve as a concept for diagnosing
problems in constitutional decisionmaking, its definition must be precise
enough to differentiate between these two decisions. Accordingly, this Part
presents an analytically precise definition of overdelegation—supported
with examples of when it has potentially occurred and, just as importantly,
when it has not occurred. It then clarifies the descriptive limits of this
definition, and explains how these limits serve to create an account of
overdelegation that does not rely on controversial, normative assumptions
about how to interpret the Constitution’s criminal procedure guarantees.
A. DEFINING OVERDELEGATION

In order to present a concept of delegation with this sort of diagnostic
value, this Article defines it as follows: in criminal procedure cases,
overdelegation occurs when a court grants law enforcement officials more
discretion about whether to comply with a constitutional obligation than it
is rational to grant in light of the court’s objectives. This definition appeals
to the conceptual distinction between a court’s ability to determine the
scope of a constitutional guarantee and its ability to implement that
guarantee successfully in light of the uncertainty and contingencies that
exist in the real world.76 While a court may decide what obligations a
constitutional right would impose on perfectly compliant law enforcement
officials operating under ideal circumstances, it is more difficult to
articulate a legal doctrine that perfectly enforces those obligations. 77
Instead, if it is deciding rationally, the court must choose the doctrinal rule
most likely to achieve its ideal outcome.
The Supreme Court must make this choice in the face of considerable
epistemic uncertainty, and with relatively limited power to enforce the rules
it has created. Because rules of criminal procedure impose costs, there is an
incentive to circumvent them. State legislatures can do this by enacting
substantive criminal laws that make it easier for police to make arrests and
prosecutors to obtain convictions, or by underfunding indigent defense

exclusionary rule).
76
See supra notes 42–50 and accompanying text; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The
Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2008).
77
See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1651 (discussing the “fallacy of perfect enforcement,”
which “assumes that doctrinal rules are simply a way of getting the right answers in
constitutional cases”).

2013]

STRUCTURAL OVERDELEGATION

429

services. 78 Law enforcement officers themselves have innumerable ways to
circumvent not only flexible standards that are intended to cabin their
discretion 79 but also bright-line rules that clearly state the conduct they
require. 80 Courts lack the authority to enforce their own constitutional
decrees, as well as the ability to conduct sustained oversight over police
practices. 81 Thus, in order to protect criminal procedure rights in a
meaningful way, courts require the information necessary to predict how
states and law enforcement officers may attempt to circumvent their
constitutional obligations, and to determine which regulatory measures are
most effective for assuring their compliance.82 This doctrinal choice
presents the Court with a relatively straightforward principal–agent
78
See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) (analyzing how legislatures may use substantive criminal law to
circumvent the costs of constitutional criminal procedure rules); see also Norman Lefstein,
In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 835, 843–44 (2004) (“It should come as no surprise . . . that not only have
states resisted adequate funding of indigent defense systems, but they also have differed
about whether state or local jurisdictions should provide funding and have developed a
variety of delivery methods.”).
79
For example, police officers receive an extremely high level of deference about their
determinations whether there was probable cause to conduct a stop, as long as they are
prepared to invoke their “experience and expertise” as the basis of their decision. See
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699–700 (1996) (holding that appellate courts must
review trial courts’ probable cause determinations de novo, but accord “due weight” to the
inferences of police officers in light of law enforcement experience and expertise); David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 271, 301 (explaining that, in Ornelas, “the Court in effect declared that police
officers should receive as much deference as trial judges”).
80
See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure,
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1407 (2011). For example, one instance of circumventing bright line
rules is the practice of questioning “outside Miranda,” where police officers intentionally
fail to comply with Miranda knowing that whatever evidence they gain will be admissible
for impeachment purposes or under one of Miranda’s exceptions. See Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 189–92 (1998) [hereinafter
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda] (documenting widespread practice); cf. Charles D.
Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1552–57 (2008) (documenting that
questioning outside Miranda has largely ceased as a systemic practice, but that some
agencies persist with the policy).
81
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786 (1970) (“[T]he Supreme Court, like any other
court, lacks the sort of supervisory power over the practices of the police that is possessed by
the chief of police or the district attorney.”); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13–14
(1968) (discussing the limits of the exclusionary rule “as a tool of judicial control”).
82
Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 32 (2009)
(“Any discussion of the appropriate forms of regulation can (and must) exist separate from
the rights debate and focus instead upon claims about the actual (descriptive) and appropriate
(prescriptive) structure of police administration.”).
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problem, in which it must decide ex ante how much power to delegate to
low-level officials, but has relatively little power to monitor ex post how the
officials exercise that power. 83
The Court must choose the optimal level of discretionary authority to
delegate to law enforcement officials in light of these institutional
constraints. With respect to this choice, the congressional delegation
literature suggests that two considerations will play a particularly
significant role in the Court’s decision. 84
1. Overestimating Uncertainty
First, overdelegation occurs when a court overestimates how much
discretionary authority law enforcement officials will need to implement a
constitutional objective under conditions of uncertainty. According to the
“uncertainty principle,” a risk-averse principal should delegate a greater
degree of discretion to an agent when it is unclear whether the policy being
implemented will result in the outcome being sought.85 For example, in a
relatively simple regulatory environment, Congress might be confident that,
83

See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1285, 1290–91 (2013) (“The essence of the agency relationship is the superior
information of the agent: the principal delegates to the agent in order to take advantage of the
agent’s expertise, but because the agent has better information than the principal, the
principal will have difficulty monitoring the agent and ensuring that the agent acts in the
principal’s interest.”).
84
These considerations—the ally principle and the uncertainty principle—are by no
means the only ones that scholars have deemed relevant to how legislatures choose to
delegate power. See generally EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 14–33 (reviewing
the congressional delegation literature). This Article’s emphasis on the two considerations
reflects an effort to distill and concisely articulate the findings of Epstein and O’Halloran’s
influential formal model of congressional delegation, which captures many of the insights of
the congressional delegation literature. See id. at 52–85, app. A. As succinctly summarized
by political scientist Craig Volden, this model’s equilibrium establishes three hypotheses:
“[L]egislators are more likely to delegate to bureaucrats (1) when executive and legislative
preferences are aligned, (2) when legislators face high levels of uncertainty, and (3) when
legislators are limited in their ability to gain information internally from within the
legislature.” Craig Volden, Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States,
18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 187, 189 (2002); see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at
75 (summarizing their model’s findings). Note that this Article uses the concept of
uncertainty to analyze both how random shocks affect a policy outcome—which corresponds
to the second hypothesis described above—and how policy outcomes will be affected by
information that is theoretically obtainable, but is not within the court’s purview—which
corresponds to the third hypothesis.
85
See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1440 (2011) (describing the uncertainty principle, according to which
“a principal will delegate more discretion to the agent (that is, it will expand the size of the
discretionary window) when the link between policies and outcomes is less certain ex ante”).
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by drafting detailed legislation, it will be able to achieve the policy outcome
it desires without delegating discretionary authority to an agency. 86 By
contrast, in a relatively complex environment, Congress will be less
confident about how much exogenous factors—such as new information
about the problem a policy is supposed to address—will influence the
policy outcome of a piece of legislation. 87 Faced with such conditions,
Congress is more likely to delegate policymaking authority to an agency,
which can then use its expertise to take account of the exogenous factors
and reduce uncertainty over policy outcomes. 88
Analogously, in criminal procedure cases, a court must predict the
degree to which uncertainty will threaten how effectively a doctrinal rule
would serve its constitutional justification.89 If the court is aware that
exogenous factors may frustrate its ability to choose a rule that achieves its
desired outcome, then it has an incentive to give officials enough discretion
to adjust to those factors as they arise.90 For example, in City of Ontario v.
Quon, a police officer employed by the city brought a Fourth Amendment
claim and argued that the city violated his reasonable expectation of privacy
by reviewing the text messages on his work-provided pager as part of an
86

See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 75 (“The more uncertainty associated
with a policy area, the more likely Congress is to delegate authority to the executive.”).
87
See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440
(1989) (“If the best policy from the perspective of the winning coalition depends on arcane
information or is uncertain because of frequent changes in the state of knowledge about the
problem that the policy is supposed to ameliorate, . . . legislative specificity cannot identify
the policy outcome that is embodied in the legislation.”); see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN,
supra note 11, at 60–62 (modeling Congress’s delegation strategy as a function of its degree
of uncertainty concerning how random shocks might affect policy outcomes).
88
See Stephenson, supra note 85, at 1440–41 (“Th[e] uncertainty principle may be
thought of as a special case of a more general ‘expertise principle,’ according to which the
principal’s willingness to delegate increases as the agent’s expected informational advantage
increases. This hypothesis fits comfortably with one of the classic explanations (and
justifications) for the growth of the administrative state: the bureaucracy’s superior expertise,
especially on complex technical matters, is a key factor that leads Congress to delegate broad
authority to agencies.”) (footnote omitted); see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11,
at 75 (concluding from the authors’ delegation model that “as the world becomes more and
more complex, agency policy making becomes more attractive relative to [congressional]
committee action alone”).
89
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 23–54 (1991) (describing rules as
“entrenched generalizations” that are meant to serve an underlying “background
justification”).
90
Cf. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 52–75 (modeling Congress’s optimal
delegation strategy as dependent on the institution’s estimate of how external factors will
influence its desired predicted policy outcomes).
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investigation. 91 The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff-officer’s claim,
but expressly declined to use the facts of the case to “establish far-reaching
premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations
enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication
devices.” 92 Instead, the Court assumed arguendo that the officer had a
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the content of his text messages. 93
The Court then narrowly held that inasmuch as the City’s review of those
texts constituted a search, the search was reasonable based on the facts of
the case. The narrow holding, the Court explained, was justified by the
risks that uncertainty creates when applying the Fourth Amendment to new
technologies. Specifically, the Court observed that “[r]apid changes in the
dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not
just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper
behavior.” 94 In light of this technological and social flux, the Court
explained, “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society
has become clear.” 95
Thus, because of uncertainty, the Court in Quon declined to create
doctrinal rules that would impose clear constitutional constraints on public
institutions with respect to accessing their employees’ communications. 96
This does not necessarily mean the Court overestimated the degree to which
uncertainty required them to leave public institutions with discretion over
when to access workplace communications without a warrant. However,
the fact that the Court declined to establish any clear rules governing this
question suggests that this may be the case. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia seems to suggest that the Court indeed overestimated the extent to
which its judicial minimalism was justified by conditions of uncertainty:
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but
when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s implication that
91
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010). For another recent discussion of how the Court treated
the problem of uncertainty in Quon, see Kerr, supra note 24, at 539–42 (contending that
Quon’s holding supports Kerr’s “equilibrium-adjustment” theory of the Fourth Amendment).
92
Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
93
See id. at 2631.
94
Id. at 2629; cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that Fourth Amendment doctrine may need to evolve to
accommodate changes in police surveillance technology and in social attitudes regarding the
privacy of information shared with third parties).
95
Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
96
Cf. Kerr, supra note 24, at 541 (observing that the Quon Court avoided creating any
doctrinal rules, and arguing that it is preferable to create temporary Fourth Amendment rules
to govern evolving technologies).
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where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise would
(that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private
action)—or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific standards or
97
issuing opaque opinions—is in my view indefensible.

Both the Court’s caution and its candor in Quon illustrate how
uncertainty shapes the Court’s delegation choices in cases that involve rapid
technological change. However, the problem of estimating uncertainty—
and the risk of overestimating uncertainty—is also present in cases that do
not concern evolving technologies. For example, in Herring v. United
States, 98 the Court had to decide whether it should weaken the exclusionary
rule, by refusing to apply it in cases involving ordinary negligence, in order
to achieve an optimal level of compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 99
In order to make the correct delegation choice, the Court would have to
consider the unknown consequences of disrupting a well-established
doctrinal rule, such as whether trial courts would be able to determine
accurately whether an officer’s conduct was negligent or intentional if the
distinction became relevant. In addition, the Court’s optimal delegation
choice will be influenced by uncertainties that would call for giving officers
more discretion to deviate from the Court’s doctrinal rules, such as the
possibility that new social practices will make it more difficult for the
government to obtain evidence. 100 Thus, even in cases that do not involve
cutting-edge technologies, conditions of uncertainty may induce a court to
delegate to law enforcement officials the discretionary authority to deviate
from its decision rule in order to better conform their conduct to that
justification. However, to the extent that a court overestimates the degree to
which these conditions merit granting discretionary authority to law
enforcement officials, it will have engaged in overdelegation.
2. Underestimating Policy Resistance
Second, a court will overdelegate if it underestimates the extent to
which law enforcement officials will resist implementing a constitutional
objective. Often, such resistance will result from the distance that exists
between the court’s constitutional objectives and the law enforcement
officials’ own policy preferences. According to what Matthew Stephenson
97

Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted).
98
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
99
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
100
See Kerr, supra note 24, at 480 (arguing that the Supreme Court reduces Fourth
Amendment protections when “changing technology or social practice makes evidence
substantially harder for the government to obtain”).
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describes as a corollary to the ally principle, a principal will consider
whether an agent shares its policy goals in deciding how much discretion to
afford the agent. 101 Congressional delegation theorists typically assume, for
example, that an agency will use any discretionary authority it is given to
produce policy outcomes that come as close as possible to its ideal outcome
given the constraints under which the agency is operating. 102 Therefore, in
deciding how much power to delegate to an agency, Congress will consider
the extent to which the agency’s ideal policy outcome differs from its own
ideal policy outcome. 103
Analogously, in deciding how much power to delegate to law
enforcement officials, a rational court will consider the likely extent to
which those officials will be opposed to the court’s constitutional
objectives. If the court is aware that law enforcement officials are
particularly hostile to the court’s desired outcome, then it has an incentive
to limit the officials’ discretion.104 For example, in Hudson v. Michigan,
the Supreme Court cited “the increasing professionalism of police forces,
including a new emphasis on internal police discipline,” as a reason not to
categorically apply the exclusionary rule for “knock-and-announce”
violations. 105 If this “increasing professionalism” were evidence that law
enforcement officials had become increasingly committed to honoring their
Fourth Amendment obligations, then it would indeed weigh in favor of
delegating greater discretionary authority. However, as police officers
become more familiar with the intricacies of Fourth Amendment doctrine,
their knowledge may enable them to manipulate their encounters with
suspects (and their testimony during suppression hearings) to ensure that
101

See Stephenson, supra note 85, at 1440 (describing a corollary to the “ally principle”
whereby a principle who “is not able to select a perfect ally as its agent . . . will locate the
discretionary window to (partially) offset the agent’s predicted bias”).
102
See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 52–75 (modeling Congress’s optimal
delegation strategy as dependent on the distance between its ideal policy outcome and the
agency’s ideal policy outcome).
103
See id.
104
See Stephenson, supra note 85, at 1440. Arguably, there also may be occasions when
law enforcement officials’ hostility toward a constitutional objective could incentivize courts
to grant them more discretion over implementing the objective. For example, the Court’s
decision not to order immediate enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education is widely
regarded to reflect a strategy of gradually diffusing official opposition to school
desegregation. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 624–26
(1983) (analyzing the controversy over Brown II’s “all deliberate speed” standard); see also
supra note 59 and accompanying text. Provided that such a strategy of increased discretion
is justified by the practical difficulties of implementing a constitutional objective, it may not
necessarily be one of overdelegation. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
105
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
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any evidence they obtain will be admissible under one of the exclusionary
rule’s many exceptions. Thus, increased professionalism could also
indicate that police officers have become increasingly adept at violating the
Fourth Amendment without having a court detect the violation or impose a
penalty. 106 A court should therefore examine the ways in which law
enforcement institutions’ training practices influence their policy aims
before deciding whether or not those practices provide a reason for
delegating greater discretionary authority.
Likewise, if law enforcement officials are simply not competent to use
the discretion afforded to them in order to address any future circumstances
that might arise, then the Court will have an incentive to limit their
discretion. These competency questions will arise not only when law
enforcement officials are undertrained or ignorant of their constitutional
duties, but also when highly trained law enforcement officials confront a
problem that they lack the institutional resources to address. In Maryland v.
Shatzer, for example, the Supreme Court addressed when officers may
question a suspect who had previously invoked his Miranda right to counsel
while detained for questioning, but who has since been released from
custody. 107 The Court reasoned that, under its earlier precedents, an officer
should be free to reinitiate questioning once a defendant is both released
from custody and free from its “lingering effects.”108 Ideally, because
custody will affect people in very different ways depending on the
circumstances of their detention and their psychological makeup, a court
might wish to have law enforcement officials (or perhaps neutral
magistrates) make this determination on a case-by-case basis. However,
neither trial judges nor law enforcement officials are likely to have the
information or psychological training necessary to decide, on a prompt
106
See Dripps, supra note 52, at 238 (“[T]here is substantial evidence tending to show
that police professionalism actually increases the risk that the police will exploit weaknesses
in the remedial scheme by violating substantive Fourth Amendment rights for the sake of
incriminating evidence. The exclusionary rule gives cities and departments an incentive to
train their forces, but the training the police receive seems to be more concerned with
admissibility than with legality.”).
107
See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010); see also Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that because of the inherently compelling pressures of
custody, a police officer may not reinitiate an interrogation after the defendant had invoked
this right); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966) (holding that police must
inform a suspect prior to interrogation that he has the right to an attorney, and must cease
questioning if the suspect invokes this right). The defendant in Shatzer was, in fact,
incarcerated for an unrelated conviction when police reinterrogated him. The Court held,
however, that the defendant’s release into the general prison population constituted a break
in custody for Miranda purposes. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224–25.
108
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222.
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basis, whether a particular defendant is free from the “lingering effects” of
custody. Accordingly, the Court did not grant officials unconstrained
discretion to determine when they should reinterrogate a suspect who
invoked his Miranda right to counsel, but instead ruled that law
enforcement officials must wait at least fourteen days before resuming
interrogation. 109
Thus, because law enforcement officials typically lack the competence
to evaluate how incarceration operates on a suspect’s psyche, the Court
chose not to delegate to them the discretionary authority to make this
assessment. However, there remains a question as to whether the Court in
Shatzer nonetheless granted officers too much authority in light of their
likely hostility to the constitutional objective of safeguarding the Miranda
right to counsel. If officers are in fact hostile to this objective, they may
exploit Shatzer’s holding by attempting to interrogate suspects every two
To the extent that the Court
weeks until they break down. 110
underestimated this possibility, or failed to consider it at all, then Shatzer’s
holding represents an instance of overdelegation. And, regardless whether
such overdelegation occurred, Shatzer presents a clear instance of when it is
conceptually useful to frame the Court’s constitutional decisionmaking as a
delegation strategy.
***
These two considerations—how external factors might frustrate the
court’s constitutional objectives and the degree to which law enforcement
officials are unwilling or unable to advance these objectives—form the
measure of whether a court has engaged in overdelegation. If a court is
making an optimal criminal procedure decision, it will delegate as much
discretion to law enforcement officials as the considerations warrant.
However, if the court delegates more discretion to law enforcement officials
than these considerations warrant, then it has unnecessarily provided law
enforcement officials the freedom to disregard the court’s constitutional
objectives in favor of their own policy aims. Accordingly, the court will
engage in overdelegation if, in deciding how much discretion to confer on
low-level officials, it either: (1) overestimates the threat that law
enforcement officials will be unable to comply with a court’s constitutional
objective if they are not given the flexibility to adjust their policies; or (2)
underestimates the extent to which law enforcement officials are either

109

Id. at 1223.
See Fan, supra note 80, at 1411 & n.11 (discussing how police officers may
circumvent Shatzer).
110
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hostile to that objective or unable to use their discretion to work toward
achieving it.
B. IDENTIFYING OVERDELEGATION

Thus defined, the concept of overdelegation offers a useful tool for
critiquing the allocations of institutional power that result from the Supreme
Court’s doctrinal decisions. Moreover, this tool can be shared by people
who have deep (and potentially intractable) theoretical disagreements about
the scope of the Constitution’s criminal procedure protections. 111 This is
because the concept allows for an analytical framework that distinguishes
between a court’s constitutional objectives, which can be treated as
exogenous to the analysis, and the Court’s strategy for achieving those
objectives, which can be treated as endogenous. This, in turn, makes it
theoretically possible to use the concept of overdelegation to evaluate
whether a Justice is setting a level of law enforcement discretion that
optimizes her ideal constitutional outcome, without making a normative
assessment of that outcome’s value.
For example, the concept of overdelegation can be used to disentangle
two points of disagreement, one normative and one institutional, between
the majority and dissent in Michigan v. Bryant 112 regarding the scope of the
ongoing emergency exception to the Confrontation Clause. In his dissent,
Justice Scalia argues that the Confrontation Clause does not permit courts to
consider a police officer’s intent in eliciting the witness’s statements. This
criticism reflects a normative disagreement between the dissent and the
majority regarding the proper scope of the Confrontation Clause. In
addition to this normative critique, however, Justice Scalia essentially
accuses the majority of irrationally delegating more authority to law
enforcement officials than its own constitutional objective warrants.
Specifically, Scalia can be understood as critiquing the decision rule the
Court created with its holding that the statements at issue in Bryant were
admissible despite the police having questioned the witness before
conducting any investigation of the crime scene and continued the
interrogation for ten minutes. 113 Essentially, Scalia argued, this holding
gave police and prosecutors the discretion to have statements admitted
under the ongoing emergency exception even when it is manifestly clear
that the interrogation was conducted to investigate “a past crime with no
111

See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1751–54 (1994).
112
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
113
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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ongoing or immediate consequences.” 114
In making this second argument, Scalia essentially accuses the
majority of overdelegation, and framing it in these terms makes it possible
to examine the Court’s decision with greater conceptual clarity. In order to
resolve Scalia’s normative dispute with the majority, one would have to
stake a position on a normatively contentious constitutional question: the
proper scope of the Confrontation Clause. With respect to the delegation
question, however, the merits of Scalia’s critique can be evaluated by
considering two sets of facts: (1) the extent to which external factors might
cause the decision rule to fall short as a way of achieving the Court’s
constitutional objective; and (2) the extent to which the policy preferences
of law enforcement officials diverge from the Court’s constitutional
objectives. The concept of overdelegation can thus lend tractability to a
debate that might otherwise get conflated with a deeper normative debate
about the true meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
C. DESCRIPTIVE LIMITS

By defining overdelegation narrowly, the concept can be used to
differentiate between delegation decisions that are normatively misguided
and those that are simply irrational. This narrowing, however, comes at the
cost of complete descriptive accuracy. In practice, the conceptual
distinction between determining the content of a constitutional norm and
crafting a set of doctrinal rules that successfully implement that norm often
may be blurred. 115
First, a decision that appears to involve overdelegation may, in fact, be
motivated by hostility to the right at issue. That is, a court may profess
fidelity to a well-established constitutional objective but intentionally craft
decision and remedial rules that permit law enforcement officials to
undermine that objective. 116 Thus, the doctrinal rules will overdelegate
authority with respect to the court’s stated constitutional objective, but
optimally delegate authority with respect to its actual objective.
For judges hostile to constitutional interpretations that redound to the
114

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Stephenson, supra note 76, at 10–11; see also David L. Faigman, “Normative
Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional
Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544, 546 (1991).
116
See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2469 (1996) (arguing that, since the
Warren Court era, “[r]ather than redrawing in any drastic fashion the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional police conduct, the Supreme Court has revolutionized the
consequences of deeming conduct unconstitutional”).
115
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benefit of criminal defendants, this delegation strategy is an attractive
option for achieving their substantive goals. As explained above, the
Supreme Court stands in a principal–agent relationship to low-level
officials in criminal procedure cases, in which the Court can control how
much discretion to accord the officials but has relatively little power to
monitor how the officials exercise that discretion. 117 Congressional
delegation scholars have posited that, under a “blame-shifting” model of
Congressional delegation, principals are more inclined to delegate power to
agents when doing so will enable them to avoid responsibility for unpopular
policy choices. 118 This principle helps explain why a Supreme Court
Justice who is hostile to the rights of suspects and defendants might adopt a
decision rule that empowers low-level officials to self-monitor their
protection of a constitutional right rather than simply deny the existence of
that right. Some constitutional criminal procedure rights are firmly
entrenched in the public imagination, and a decision that repudiates these
rights might create considerable backlash against the Court.119 Such
backlash may be less severe, however, if the Court continues to affirm the
existence of the right but implements decision rules that ensure that the
right is rarely protected.120 In criminal procedure cases, the Court has the
option to delegate the decision whether to honor a constitutional right to
agents who have obvious incentives not to do so—police and prosecutors.
A Supreme Court Justice who is hostile to the rights of suspects and
defendants can reasonably expect these agents to share his political aims,
and (all other things equal) can thus be expected to delegate power to them.
Conversely, a set of doctrinal rules might appear to be optimal with
respect to the Court’s stated constitutional objective, but only because
delegation pressures have influenced the judge’s interpretation of the
underlying constitutional right. 121 Instead of revising a decision rule in
117

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
48–49 (2d ed. 1989); cf. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 32–33 (noting the
controversial assumptions underlying the blame-shifting model, but arguing that it
nonetheless “captures some of the motivations behind legislators’ decision to delegate”);
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 81–82 (1991) (observing that the blame-shifting model relies on the
controversial assumptions that voters will be constantly fooled by congressional blameshifting efforts, and will not pressure Congress to develop better oversight mechanisms).
119
See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY
181 (2001) (discussing how the Court’s decisions in Miranda became entrenched in the
public culture).
120
See Steiker, supra note 116, at 2548–51.
121
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (arguing that “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just
118
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order to better obtain a constitutional objective, the judge might
(consciously or otherwise) choose a different constitutional objective that is
easier to implement. Thus, a judicial opinion that appears to be motivated
by the Court’s interpretation of a constitutional guarantee may in fact be
motivated by delegation concerns. For example, consider the Supreme
Court’s decision in Perry v. New Hampshire. 122 In Perry the Court held
that the Due Process Clause does not bar the use of unreliable eyewitness
testimony in cases where police did not arrange the circumstances that
rendered the testimony unreliable.123 As a practical matter, this holding
arguably gives prosecutors considerable leeway to introduce unreliable (but
nonetheless persuasive) evidence that would be constitutionally barred in
other circumstances.124 Nevertheless, on its face the Court’s holding does
not suggest that the Court engaged in overdelegation. Instead, the Court
simply determined that it had no constitutional authority to regulate the use
of unreliable eyewitness identification evidence when the police had no role
in rendering it unreliable, and constructed its doctrine accordingly.
However, while the Court’s holding was ostensibly based on the scope of
the Due Process Clause, it also expressed concerns about endorsing a
constitutional objective that would “open the door to judicial preview,
under the banner of due process, of most, if not all, eyewitness
identifications.” 125 If this concern motivated the Court to adopt a view of
the Due Process Clause with which it otherwise disagreed, then the decision
in Perry would in fact be a form of overdelegation.
These two forms of overdelegation—where the Court either does not
say what it means or does not know what it means—are not detectable
under a definition that draws a sharp distinction between a court’s
constitutional objective and its strategy for implementing that objective. In
order to create the concept of overdelegation that captures such decisions,
one would have to redefine it in terms of some fixed theory of constitutional
interpretation rather than simply by reference to whatever constitutional
theory the Court chooses for itself. Ultimately, there would be considerable
value in defining a concept of irrational delegation that is rooted in a
for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence”).
122
132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). Since the Supreme Court had last addressed the constitutional
limits of using eyewitness testimony, see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), a
wealth of scholarship had established it to be a particularly untrustworthy form of evidence.
See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 732–33, 739 nn.6–11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (summarizing the
scholarship).
123
See id. at 730 (majority opinion).
124
E.g., Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113 (barring the use of unreliable eyewitness testimony
obtained through “unnecessarily suggestive” police procedures).
125
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 727.
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normative constitutional theory, as the concept may offer a richer and more
descriptively accurate concept for critically analyzing judicial
decisionmaking.
However, the aim of this Article is simply to make the case that
overdelegation is conceptually distinct from bad constitutional theorizing
and that, given the structure of criminal procedure decisionmaking, it
plausibly accounts for many of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal choices in
that area of law. For all its merits, a more robust concept of overdelegation
would frustrate this aim by sparking theoretical disagreements about its
normative underpinnings and inviting the accusation that the concept is
merely a rhetorical device for condemning bad constitutional reasoning.
The circumscribed concept of overdelegation presented here, by contrast,
errs on the side of being underinclusive in order to avoid false positives—
decisions that appear to be instances of overdelegation but which are
actually rational delegation choices in light of the Court’s constitutional
objectives. The concept thus preserves a sharp distinction between
disapproving of a court’s delegation choices and disliking its constitutional
aims.
III. OVERDELEGATION’S STRUCTURAL SOURCES
The possibility that the Supreme Court is likely to overdelegate power
in criminal procedure cases, while perhaps intuitively obvious to those
familiar with the doctrine, is theoretically puzzling. By definition,
overdelegation is a suboptimal strategy for a court to achieve its
constitutional aims. One would not, therefore, necessarily expect to see
courts doing it systematically.
Moreover, to the extent that courts do commit some sort of systemic
delegation error in their decisionmaking, conventional wisdom suggests it
would be one of underdelegation. This is because developing an effective
delegation strategy requires courts to critically assess their own competence
to construct decision rules that are likely to achieve their constitutional
objectives, and compare it to the competence of law enforcement officials
to achieve those objectives using the discretionary authority that is
delegated to them. 126 Most institutional choice theorists assume the error
one is most likely to commit when engaging in this type of comparative
institutional analysis is to accord less deference to other institutions than a
comparative institutional analysis would dictate. 127 As much as anyone
126

See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
127
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(and probably more so), judges are susceptible to egocentric bias, which
leads them to overestimate their own competence and decisionmaking
ability relative to others. 128 Moreover, judges’ goals often align with the
interests of the courts on which they serve and, what’s more, are partly
shaped by those interests.129 Traditional separation of powers theory thus
assumes that a court’s members will have “personal motives” to protect and
enhance the institution’s power vis-à-vis the executive and legislature—
thus ensuring that “[a]mbition” is “made to counteract ambition.” 130
The doctrinal trajectory of criminal procedure, however, invites the
hypothesis that the Court systematically overdelegates discretionary
authority to law enforcement officials in this area of law. It is therefore
worth examining the structural features of constitutional criminal procedure
that differentiate it from other areas of constitutional decisionmaking and
analyzing whether they might incentivize the Supreme Court to delegate
authority to law enforcement officials irrationally. Accordingly, this Part
Interpretation and Institutions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 885, 937 & n.177 (2003).
128
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 811–15
(2001) (describing egocentric biases and reporting findings from an empirical study on
judges’ susceptibility to them).
129
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 988
(2009) (arguing that “[t]he matrix of constitutionally established roles not only shapes and
limits what officials can do, but presumably also influences what they want to do”); Stephen
Skowronek, Order and Change, 28 POLITY 91, 94 (1995) (“[I]nstitutions do not simply
constrain or channel the actions of self-interested individuals, they prescribe actions,
construct motives, and assert legitimacy. That indeed is how institutions perpetuate the
objectives or purposes instilled in them at their founding; that is what lies at the heart of their
staying power.”); Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 615 (2000) (reviewing
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999))
(“[I]nstitutions are both regulative and constitutive. They constrain choices by structuring
incentives, but they also shape preferences by influencing ideas.”); see also James L.
Gibson, Judges’ Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 911, 922 (1978) (evaluating how role orientation constrained the judicial
ideology of a set of state supreme court justices).
130
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 56, at 319 (James Madison); see also Howard
Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism
and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 66 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING] (noting that new
institutionalists “shift their focus away from the long-standing question of how institutions
are affected by the personal characteristics of judges and toward the question of how judges
are affected by the institutional characteristics within which they are embedded”); Dripps,
supra note 52, at 237 (arguing that “[t]he Court consistently has jealously guarded its power
over criminal procedure”).
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identifies four features of criminal procedure decisionmaking that, in
conjunction, make it a structurally unique area of constitutional law. It also
explores the ways in which these features incentivize the Supreme Court to
delegate more power to law enforcement officials than the Court’s
constitutional objectives might warrant.
A. REGULATORY COMPLEXITY (AND SINGLE INSTITUTIONALISM)

When an institution’s members realize the limits of their
organization’s competence to address an issue, they may be prone to divest
the institution of power without reflecting on whether any other institution
is, in fact, more competent to address the issue. This error is an instance of
what Neil Komesar describes as the fallacy of “single institutionalism.” 131
Typically, the fallacy is associated with a failure to entrust other institutions
with decisions that they are relatively well positioned to make. The
structure of constitutional criminal procedure decisionmaking, however,
creates the possibility not only that judges will commit this fallacy, but that
the error will lead them to overdelegate discretionary authority to law
enforcement officials.
The risk that courts will commit the single institutionalist fallacy arises
from constitutional criminal procedure’s regulatory complexity. In crafting
criminal procedure doctrine, the Supreme Court creates rules that govern
nearly a million federal, state, and local law enforcement officials.132 This
131

NEIL K. KOMESAR,
OF RIGHTS 25 (2001).

LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND

132
This collective figure of police and prosecutors employed nationwide has not been
reported in any publication, but reflects the best available data. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 2 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2010/10statrpt.pdf (reporting that
6,075 full-time attorneys were employed in U.S. Attorneys’ offices nationwide, and that 79%
of this personnel worked exclusively on criminal prosecutions); STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN
BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 4 tbl.2 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf (reporting that in 2007 state prosecutors’ offices employed
approximately 27,000 prosecutors); BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 1 (2012), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf (reporting that federal agencies employed
approximately 120,000 full time law enforcement officers with arrest authority in September
2008); BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (reporting that in September 2008, state
and local law enforcement agencies employed about 765,000 personnel with general arrest
powers). Collectively, this data suggests that, nationwide, there are approximately 885,000
federal, state, and local police officers; and 31,800 federal and state prosecutors. The Bureau
of Justice Statistics does not report the number of municipal and county prosecutors
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task is complicated by the fact that, at least theoretically, the scope of the
Constitution’s criminal procedure guarantees may not “vary from place to
place and from time to time.” 133 The Court must therefore construct rules
meant to impose the same constitutional obligations on an official in
Montana as on an official in Brooklyn, notwithstanding the geographic and
demographic differences between their jurisdictions. 134 Such regulation
requires courts to determine both what level of discretion state-level actors
must be accorded in order to perform their work safely and effectively, and
how much judicial restraint of those actors is necessary to protect suspects’
rights. 135
Crafting criminal procedure decision rules thus requires courts to adopt
what one scholar has aptly called “regulatory strategies” for governing the
conduct of low-level state actors. 136 As the Supreme Court frequently
emphasizes, the success of a particular decision rule depends on whether it
effectively implements the constitutional guarantee in question while
respecting the general societal interest in law enforcement. 137 For example,
when deciding whether the exclusionary rule is a sound decision rule for
enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches, the Court must assimilate information concerning the institutional
culture of police,138 their training, 139 the extent to which there is oversight
employed nationwide. See PERRY & BANKS, supra, at 1. It is plausible to assume, however,
that these officials would put the nationwide population of police and prosecutors at over one
million. (For some reason, the U.S. Department of Justice’s 2011 Annual Statistical Report
does not provide data on the staffing of U.S. Attorneys’ offices. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2011/11statrpt.pdf.
133
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (holding that the scope of the
Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure protections is not contingent on the police
regulations in place in a given jurisdiction).
134
Cf. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments
and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1629 (2006) (challenging the premise that
constitutional protections must invariably “apply in the same way as against federal, state,
and local governments”).
135
See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1736–45
(2006); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 16–17 (1997).
136
Miller, supra note 82, at 38.
137
Cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–49 (1976) (“Jurists and scholars
uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the
societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant
evidence.”).
138
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (rejecting a categorical rule
of suppressing evidence for knock-and-announce violations as unnecessary in light of “the
increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police
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over their interactions with suspects, 140 and an array of other institutional
factors. 141
Criminal procedure cases thus present challenges for which courts are
institutionally ill equipped. In most constitutional adjudication, the court
reviews a regulatory strategy that was designed by a legislature or executive
agency, both of which typically possess large staffs of fact-gatherers. 142 In
crafting criminal procedure rules, however, judges must design regulatory
strategies with the benefit of only a few law clerks helping research and
draft opinions (and, in the case of Supreme Court clerks, select cases for
review). 143 Moreover, beyond these institutional handicaps, judges who
adhere to a strict “party presentation model of adjudication” might view
gathering facts from outside the record to be incompatible with their duty to
limit themselves to arguments presented by the parties to the case before
them. 144
This complexity creates a strong temptation for the Court to delegate
authority to law enforcement officials without carefully and critically
evaluating whether the delegation is warranted. In order to adopt a rational
delegation strategy when confronted with the choice of which institution
should be entrusted to make a decision, one must weigh the comparative
strengths and weaknesses of both institutions. The fact that a particular
institution may be ill equipped to make certain judgments does not
necessarily mean that the institution should not be entrusted to make those
judgments; one must also determine whether any other institution is better
equipped to make them. In other words, when there are only bad options,
the best choice will still be a bad choice.145
discipline”); see also Sklansky, supra note 135, at 1797–99 (discussing how research on
police culture has influenced criminal procedure scholarship).
139
See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (requiring appellate
courts to defer to police inferences about suspicious behavior in light of their “experience
and expertise”).
140
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448–49 (1965) (emphasizing the secrecy
of the custodial interrogation process).
141
See Sklansky, supra note 135, at 1704 (discussing how social science has influenced
the “jurisprudence of policing and academic commentary on that jurisprudence”); cf. Miller,
supra note 82, at 33 (demonstrating that modern criminal procedure “rests upon a variety of
untested regulatory assumptions about the ways in which the police do and ought to interact
with the public”).
142
See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1998).
143
Id. at 53.
144
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1870 (1998).
145
KOMESAR, supra note 131, at 24.
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Selecting the least-worst choice, however, presents judges with two
significant problems in the criminal procedure context. First, the decision
to regulate officials using a constitutional criminal procedure rule is not
easily correctable if it turns out to have been a mistake. 146 Because
constitutional decisions are mandatory, any new criminal procedure rule
that later proves misguided will be impossible for the legislature to revise,
and difficult for the Court to overturn. 147 This reversibility problem
deprives the Court of a particularly desirable strategy for addressing
problems under conditions of uncertainty: using a series of small, reversible
steps that place few ex ante burdens on the initial decisionmaker and few ex
post burdens on any subsequent decisionmaker (a second-order strategy that
Cass Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit refer to as “Low-Low”). 148
Second, when relying on law enforcement officials to implement a
constitutional objective, the Court faces a classic agency problem. In a
principal–agent relationship, the agent will have superior information
regarding the task being delegated, and the principal will have difficulty
ensuring that the agent uses that informational advantage to act in the
principal’s interest. 149 In criminal procedure cases, much of the information
courts require to create effective criminal procedure decision rules—the
measures necessary to ensure police safety, whether failing to present
mitigation evidence in a capital case constitutes a viable defense strategy,
etc.—is in the hands of the actors criminal procedure rules are meant to
regulate. Accordingly, criminal procedure adjudication requires courts to
harness the informal knowledge that low-level officials possess about how
to perform their jobs effectively, and translate that informal knowledge into
146

See ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS: AUTHORITY AND
ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 36–37 (2001) (explaining the concept of
correctability and arguing that a formal system of governance must be correctable in order to
be stable).
147
Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the
“Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 480–85 (2001)
(discussing disagreements among political scientists and legal scholars about the extent to
which precedent influences judicial decisionmaking); Stuntz, supra note 5, at 792–93
(arguing that the mandatory nature of criminal procedure rules makes it costly for
legislatures to create additional protections for criminal suspects).
148
Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5,
7 (1999).
149
Cox & Posner, supra note 83, at 1290–91; see also T. Bendor et al., Theories of
Delegation, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI., 235, 240 (2001) (explaining that “informational
asymmetries between [the] principal and agent” are regarded as “central to delegation”);
Elizabeth Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 885
(2009) (explaining that in principal–agent relationships, “[t]he agent does not have the same
incentives as the principal and also can have superior information”).
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rules that effectively implement constitutional protections. 150 This process
is complicated, however, by the fact that these officials do not necessarily
share the courts’ constitutional aims, and thus have an incentive to withhold
that information. 151 Thus, if the Court wishes to assess how the day-to-day
realities of law enforcement will influence the outcomes of a doctrinal rule
it is contemplating, it has to do so based on information that those officials
possess and may not be willing to share.
Faced with these decisionmaking difficulties, a rational court would
attempt to estimate both its own uncertainty about how unknown factors
might thwart its policy objective and law enforcement officials’ desire and
ability to disregard that objective in favor of their own. The court would
then choose to delegate no more power to law enforcement officials than
would be necessary under that estimate. However, a court may not want to
go through the trouble of making such an estimate or might feel
underequipped to do so. In either case, the court might be tempted to
delegate discretionary authority to law enforcement officials without first
analyzing whether they are better equipped than the court to implement a
constitutional objective. In other words, a judge deciding whether to retain
power within her own institution or to delegate it to another institution may
simply select the option she knows the least about—and which therefore
strikes her as less unappealing than the option with which she is familiar.
This is a symptom of humans’ cognitive architecture that influences
(and sometimes distorts) decisionmaking where information is limited and
decisions must be made quickly. 152 Specifically, judges facing a complex
problem and acting on incomplete information may rely to their detriment
on the availability heuristic, such that the institutional limitations of their
court are far more salient to them than the limitations of an institution to
which it is able to delegate authority. 153 When this happens, the court may
150
Cf. STINCHCOMBE, supra note 146, at 29 (discussing the difficulty that managers face
in translating the informal knowledge of effective workers into rules that will guide new
workers).
151
See supra Part II.A.
152
See BRYAN D. JONES, POLITICS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE: BOUNDED
RATIONALITY AND GOVERNANCE 131–59 (2001); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 130–32 (2006)
(describing the decisionmaking conditions of courts); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu
Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly):
Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 100–05 (2002) (describing
judges’ institutional and cognitive constraints).
153
See Anthony O’Rourke, The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure Litigation, 45
GA. L. REV. 721, 743 & n.73 (2011) (summarizing literature on the availability heuristic and
discussing its relevance to criminal procedure interpretation).
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reflexively overestimate the decisionmaking ability of other institutions on
the assumption (or perhaps the hope) that they will be better equipped to
handle the problem at issue.
Consider, for example, the Court’s decision in Herring to eliminate the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations involving
ordinary negligence. 154 As explained above, the Herring Court appears to
have overdelegated power to law enforcement officials because it failed to
adequately evaluate either the exclusionary rule’s social costs and deterrent
value or the Fourth Amendment training practices and cultural behaviors of
local police departments.155 Crucially, however, the Court’s failure to
consider information relevant to its delegation decision was not because it
lacked access to the information. For example, the Court failed to justify its
claim that the exclusionary rule had only marginal deterrent value for
negligent misconduct, despite the dissent highlighting that it lies “counter to
a foundational premise of tort law . . . that liability for negligence . . .
creates an incentive to act with greater care.” 156 Moreover, an amicus brief
submitted by two influential Supreme Court litigators (Walter Dellinger and
Pamela Harris) documented the strong empirical evidence of the
exclusionary rule’s value in deterring negligent misconduct. 157 This brief
included evidence that the exclusionary rule has served as a catalyst for
improved police training, and suggests that limitations on the exclusionary
rule have an adverse effect on police training. 158
Of course, the Court should have evaluated these claims against
potential counterarguments, and the government presented some theoretical
justification for the idea that the exclusionary rule would not effectively
deter the type of clerical errors at issue in Herring. 159 However, rather than
undertake such an analysis, the Court merely declared, ipsa dixit, that the
exclusionary rule cannot be justified in deterrence cases in light of its
substantial costs. The Court’s error thus appears to have been one of
reflexive overdelegation, resulting from a healthy appreciation of its own
institutional limitations, and a failure to consider whether any other
institution was competent to fill the regulatory void that narrowing the
exclusionary rule would create.
154

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
See supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text.
156
Herring, 555 U.S. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
157
See Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in
Support of Petitioner at 3–13, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513).
158
See id.
159
See Brief for the United States at 22–23, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135
(2009) (No. 07-513).
155
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B. DOCTRINAL ENTRENCHMENT MECHANISMS

Even if courts avoid the single institutionalism fallacy when deciding
cases, criminal procedure’s regulatory complexity creates an additional risk.
As discussed above, one factor relevant to designing an optimal delegation
strategy is whether the officials will be hostile to the court’s objective. 160 If
this simply involved observing the officials’ existing policy preferences, the
task would be relatively straightforward. However, when assessing the
relative competence of two institutions, it is dangerous to assume that one
institution’s choices will not affect the other’s competence. If a court treats
another institution’s goals and abilities as static, it may fail to recognize
how its own doctrinal choices might affect the institution’s competence.161
Thus, if a court were to assume that a law enforcement institution’s policy
preferences were fixed, but those preferences were in fact dependent on the
court’s doctrinal choices, the court may overdelegate.
The structure of criminal procedure suggests that, in fact, judicial
doctrine and law enforcement institutions’ policy objectives are interrelated
in ways that are often difficult to recognize. For all its regulatory intricacy,
constitutional criminal procedure is at bottom a normative exercise, in
which courts identify constitutional goals and devise doctrinal rules to
implement them. 162 Like all constitutional rights, these rules will be
effective only insofar as government officials commit themselves to abide
by them, even when it is apparently against their interests to do so. 163
Accordingly, scholars of constitutional design have elaborated on
Madisonian theory to examine how the Constitution’s structural provisions
selectively empower decisionmakers whose ambitions and incentives are
aligned with constitutional values.164 However, the actors governed by
criminal procedure rules are not members of elected legislatures, but are
instead low-level officials who do not occupy any positions within the
Madisonian structure of incentive compatibility. It is, therefore, not
immediately obvious how these actors become structurally invested in
upholding constitutional values that the Supreme Court articulates.
160

See supra Part II.A.
See Stephenson, supra note 85, at 1482 (“[T]he Legal Process insight that institutional
design choices must take into account the relative competence of different government
agents is incomplete, and potentially misleading, because it neglects the extent to which
institutional choices may change the relative competence of different government agents.”).
162
See supra notes 42–50 and accompanying text.
163
Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1586
(2010) (“[I]deas of entrenchment are central to the notion of constitutions.”).
164
See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 663 (2011) (describing Madisonian theory).
161
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One easy—but incomplete—answer is that judicial review is meant to
ensure the constitutional compliance of police and prosecutors. The
question of why government actors are willing to pay attention to what
courts demand is a particularly difficult one in the criminal procedure
context. Certainly, court oversight serves to punish officials who violate
criminal procedure rules by depriving them of a conviction (if they are
police or prosecutors), or by calling attention to their incompetence and
exposing them to the risk of professional sanction (if they are ineffective
defense attorneys). 165 However, the threat of such a sanction does not
adequately explain the level of compliance—however imperfect—that
criminal procedure rules enjoy. The vast majority of police encounters—in
the form of traffic stops, stop-and-frisks, and other techniques of patrol—do
not result in prosecutions that aggrieved individuals can challenge if a rights
violation occurred, 166 and civil remedies for these individuals are sharply
limited. 167 Moreover, even when police officers face the risk of rendering
evidence inadmissible, they may nevertheless have strong incentives to
violate suspects’ constitutional rights.
Beyond trying to obtain
prosecutions, police officers may engage in unconstitutional arrests because
they think that harassment is an effective form of law enforcement, or they
may decide to illegally seize evidence for the sake of getting it off the
streets. 168 Furthermore, if police have their eye on prosecution, evidence
that is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule can be used to impeach

165

Cf. Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 163, at 1590 (explaining that through judicial
review courts “reduce agency costs by ensuring that violations will be exposed and
punished”).
166
See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 818–19 (2011) (surveying NYPD data showing that
only a fraction of police stops and interrogations result in felony arrests); see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (“Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of
constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or
are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.”)
(footnote omitted).
167
See Dripps, supra note 52, at 213 (arguing that “[l]egal recognition of municipal
liability is both difficult to establish and practically irrelevant” with respect to deterring
Fourth Amendment violations); O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 773–74 (“Current doctrine
sharply limits the opportunities for victims of criminal procedure violations to use civil class
actions as a means of redressing law enforcement officers’ violations of their criminal
procedure rights, and essentially forecloses any civil opportunities to vindicate violations of
trial rights for those who have not been acquitted or had their sentences vacated.”) (footnote
omitted).
168
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 351 (2d ed. 2008).
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defendants, thus deterring them from bringing cases to trial. 169 Finally, the
chance that unconstitutionally obtained evidence will be admissible under
some doctrinal exception provides a significant incentive for officers to risk
It thus seems that, as a mere sanction,
seizing the evidence.170
constitutional review of criminal procedure cases is a weak tool for directly
influencing police behavior.
This raises the question of why low-level officers pay as much
attention as they do to what courts demand. 171 Arguably, local officials’
acceptance of court-driven criminal procedure may be of a piece with the
larger public’s acceptance of judicial supremacy. 172 However, this claim is
difficult to square with studies suggesting that police culture is governed by
very different rule-of-law norms than those governing the public. For
example, the classic study of police culture suggests that officers at one
time rejected the normative force of criminal procedure rules, believing
them to fall outside the “moral class” of laws that should command their
respect. 173 While these attitudes may have evolved to some degree, there
remains a perception that police departments continue to “operate outside
the normal processes of local government, accountable to no one.” 174 It
thus seems imprudent to assume that most municipal police and prosecutors
are part of the web of institutional relationships and shared values that
commit political actors to a common constitutional cause. It is, of course,
plausible that many of these officials feel a normative obligation to comply
with the Supreme Court some of the time, and that some of them feel an
169
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626–28 (1980) (permitting use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment for impeachment purposes); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (permitting use of confessions obtained in violation of
Miranda for impeachment purposes). Such evidence may also be used in parole revocation
hearings, Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998); deportation
proceedings, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042–44 (1984); and other significant
civil proceedings. See Fan, supra note 80, at 1478.
170
See Steiker, supra note 116, at 2470.
171
See Levinson, supra note 164, at 661 (“Casting courts as constitutional enforcers
merely pushes the question back to why powerful political actors are willing to pay attention
to what judges say . . . .”).
172
See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States
Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 364–65 (2003) (concluding that the American
public has a high degree of “institutional loyalty” toward the Supreme Court that exists
independently of how decisions in individual cases are perceived); Jamal Greene, Giving the
Constitution to the Courts: Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, 117 YALE L.J. 886,
901–11 (2008) (arguing that “members of the public, more than institutional political actors,
have laid the foundations for judicial supremacy”).
173
See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 176 (4th ed. 2011).
174
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 125 (2008).
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obligation to do so all of the time. However, these officials’ principal
occupational duties are to make arrests and obtain convictions, and it is
unclear why they would habitually prioritize the Court’s constitutional
pronouncements over these first-order goals. 175
The impact of judicial review makes more sense, however, when one
looks beyond its normative pull and examines how it affects the growth and
trajectories of law enforcement institutions, and thereby shapes the behavior
of those institutions’ members. As Daryl Levinson has observed, there are
a number of institutional mechanisms through which constitutional
arrangements, including judicial review, can become entrenched in
institutional policies and practices.176 One of these mechanisms seems
particularly effective in committing actors to adhere to constitutional
criminal procedure rules that the Supreme Court has articulated: assetspecific investment. 177 That is, police departments and prosecutor offices
often make large organizational investments in complying with particular
decisions, and individuals working within the institutions will develop their
own capabilities to work within the new organizational structure. 178 To the
extent that these investments cannot easily be reallocated toward other
organizational uses, the actors will have a stake in maintaining the existing
systems of ensuring constitutional compliance. 179
Moreover, even if law enforcement institutions could cheaply
reallocate their investments in following a constitutional rule, they may
simply come to take these investments for granted. As organizational
decisionmaking theorists have observed, some “cognitive scripts” have the
power to perpetuate patterns of policies and practices that are not
necessarily in an organization’s best interest. 180 Specifically, individuals
175

See Levinson, supra note 164, at 707 (observing that officials who are inclined to
comply with their constitutional obligations “will not necessarily prioritize the rightness of
legal compliance over the rightness (real or perceived) of their first-order political and policy
goals when the two conflict”).
176
See id.
177
See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The
Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 281–82 (1991)
(describing the role of asset specificity in creating bilateral dependencies between actors and
institutions).
178
See Levinson, supra note 164, at 686 (discussing asset specificity as a mechanism of
constitutional entrenchment).
179
See id. (“To the extent these investments are specific and cannot easily be reallocated
to alternative organizational structures or processes, political actors will want to avoid
duplicating these investments and so will have a stake in maintaining existing arrangements
and resisting reforms.”).
180
Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive
Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 496; id. at 482–
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working in an organization may internalize certain behaviors appropriate to
specific organizational situations, and take these behaviors for granted as
part of “the way the world works.” 181 Thus, some institutional policies and
practices may not be the result of some conscious decision about how the
institution should best allocate its resources, but are instead in place simply
because nobody has thought of changing them. 182
Over time, constitutional law can supply this sort of cognitive script to
law enforcement officials who otherwise have little reason to comply with a
court’s criminal procedure decisions. 183 Just as asset-specific investments
may motivate an institution to maintain a system of constitutional training
and compliance, so too may simple inertia. As law enforcement officials
who are hostile to a new constitutional criminal procedure regime retire,
they will be replaced by newcomers who have been trained under the new
regime and do not think of questioning whether to comply with it. Thus,
while officers may express hostility to a court that thrusts criminal
procedure rules on them, they may eventually come to internalize the rules
themselves and accept them as their own. For example, one influential
study on the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule documented how the
Chicago Police Department substantially revised its training protocols in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio; interviewed
decades later, Chicago police officers expressed acceptance of the
exclusionary rule in principle—even while criticizing how courts interpret
the rule. 184
84, 492; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 101, 136 & n.118 (1997) (describing “script-based cognitive conservatism” in
organizational decisionmaking). See generally Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in
Organizational Behavior, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 449, 450 (1984) (describing the explanatory
value of cognitive scripts with respect to understanding organizational decisionmaking).
181
Suchman, supra note 180, at 482; see also Gioia & Poole, supra note 180, at 449
(defining “scripts” as “schema-based knowledge of behavior and behavior sequences
appropriate to specific organizational situations and contexts”).
182
See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power,
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1867–68 (2012) (“[W]hen an organization
acts, its action is often motivated less by a calculation about the desirability of a particular
outcome than by the reality that ‘it would be unthinkable to do otherwise.’”) (quoting
Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 145,
149 (1991)).
183
See Suchman, supra note 180, at 492 (arguing that “the law often provides a system
of taken-for-granted social groundrules [sic] that operate to constitute and reify basic
assumptions of the social order”).
184
See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1028 (1987) (describing the
revision of training protocols); id. at 1051–52 (reporting officers’ perceptions of the
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Of course, the lessons the officers actually internalize through this
process may be problematic. Police departments may (and likely do) focus
on training officers how to ensure that evidence is admitted, rather than on
how to conduct legal searches and interrogations. 185 Accordingly, even as
police officers accept the reality of living with criminal procedure rules,
they may become adept at circumventing them. 186 However, insofar as
officers become habituated to following criminal procedure rules, it is clear
that the locus of criminal procedure’s success is in how it affects the
policies and training priorities of organizations, rather than how individual
officers respond to specific court decisions. 187
The fact that judicial review’s success comes this indirectly, through
slow institutional changes rather than through spontaneous acceptance,
makes it easy for courts to overlook that success. When Supreme Court
Justices observe the practices of police departments—or, more accurately,
when they look to secondary research on those practices—they may simply
see “modern police forces” that are “staffed with professionals” and
understand “what is required of them under this Court’s cases, how to
respect constitutional guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an
effective regime for internal discipline.” 188 That is, the motivations of lowlevel officials to honor constitutional rights will appear to be independent of
judicial action, when they are in fact interdependent.
Thus, the path through which judicial decisions affect behavior is a
factor that may lead the Supreme Court to overdelegate. A doctrinal choice
that would be optimal if law enforcement officials’ goals were exogenous
may turn out to be suboptimal when those goals are endogenous. 189 If the
Court does not engage in a careful comparative institutional analysis, it may
treat the competence of police and prosecutors as exogenous with respect to
its own constitutional decisions. Frequently, however, the Court’s criminal
procedure decisions will influence behavior of low-level officials only
indirectly, through institutional investments that gradually shape the

exclusionary rule).
185
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
186
See Steiker, supra note 116, at 2535–37; Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 80,
at 189–92.
187
Cf. Dripps, supra note 52, at 220 (“[T]he law influences street-level behavior
primarily by giving police administrators incentives to train and discipline the force to
comply with constitutional requirements.”).
188
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
189
Cf. Stephenson, supra note 85, at 1482 (“Institutional choices that appear prudent
when government agents’ expertise is treated as exogenous may turn out to be
counterproductive when such agents’ expertise is endogenous.”).
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officials’ practices and beliefs. That sort of doctrinal impact may not be
easily visible, and is thus liable to be overlooked.
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LITIGATION

An additional factor that could drive the Supreme Court to
overdelegate is the effective demand that exists for criminal procedure
litigation. In terms of volume, the number of Supreme Court certiorari
petitions that raise criminal procedure claims (including those filed in forma
pauperis) dwarfs the number raising other constitutional claims. The best
available data indicate that over 81% of the 8,857 certiorari petitions filed
Thus, an
in the October 2006 Term involved criminal cases. 190
overwhelming amount of the Supreme Court’s agenda space is occupied by
claims that something has gone wrong in the administration of criminal
justice. If Supreme Court Justices are paying attention to this agenda space,
then the magnitude and complexity of any systemic constitutional problems
in the criminal system will be very clear to them.
Indeed, assuming that the certiorari process is the principal vehicle by
which the Supreme Court learns about constitutional problems it could
address, 191 the structure of constitutional litigation should make the Court
far more attuned to problems that exist in the criminal justice system than in
other areas of government regulation. As I explained in a previous article,
the political economy of constitutional criminal procedure litigation, which
involves thousands of litigants motivated by individual interests, differs
from other forms of constitutional litigation, which are typically dominated
by a few policy entrepreneurs who are litigating in order to effect systemic

190

This figure reflects the filings reported in the 2007 Year-End Report of the Federal
Judiciary, and data obtained for a thorough study on certiorari filing practices in criminal
cases the prior Supreme Court Term. See JOHN ROBERTS, 2007 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2007year-endreport.pdf (reporting that 8,857 cases were filed in the October 2006
Term); Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The
Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 247–48 n.178 (2008) (identifying 347 of the certiorari
petitions filed through paid counsel in the October 2006 Term as criminal, and 6,854 of the
petitions filed in forma pauperis as potentially criminal based on the case captions).
Significantly, 3,117 of the certiorari petitions filed in forma pauperis in the October 2006
Term were filed through paid counsel. See Shay & Lasch, supra, at 247–48 n.178. Thus,
even disregarding cases filed pro se, it appears that an overwhelming percentage of the
October 2006 petitions filed through counsel arose out of criminal cases.
191
Cf. VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND
LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 4, 10–11 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme
Court signals issues that it would like litigators to place on its agenda).
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constitutional changes. 192 This aspect of criminal procedure litigation, I
argued, provides Supreme Court Justices with more opportunities to vote
according to their ideological preferences in criminal procedure cases than
they have in other areas of constitutional litigation.193
In addition to this effect on ideological voting opportunities, the
political economy of criminal procedure litigation creates pressure for
Justices to devolve power to law enforcement officials regardless of their
attitudinal preferences. In most areas of constitutional review, a policy
entrepreneur can constrain the Supreme Court’s agenda by deciding which
cases to file. 194 Through this agenda control, policy entrepreneurs can act
as filters of information that the Court receives about a constitutional issue.
If the Court becomes aware of complexities that might arise from a
proposed doctrinal change, it may be reluctant to disrupt the status quo. 195
A savvy policy entrepreneur may therefore attempt to shield the Court from
information highlighting the complexity of the problem that the policy
entrepreneur wants the Court to address. Of course, if the policy
entrepreneur chooses to file a certiorari petition in a given case, then its
opponent will have the opportunity and incentive to highlight that
complexity in its response. This adversarial opportunity will not arise,
however, unless the policy entrepreneur decides that the facts of the case
are sufficiently favorable to its position to file a certiorari petition in the
first place. 196
192

O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 731; see also Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the
Supreme Court’s Agenda, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 130, at 255,
256.
193
O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 731.
A political science article published
contemporaneously with my previous article appears to support its hypothesis. See Brandon
L. Bartels, Choices in Context: How Case-Level Factors Influence the Magnitude of
Ideological Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 AM. POL. RES. 142, 169 n.11 (2011).
194
O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 731.
195
See supra Part II.A.
196
This analysis glosses over the Supreme Court decisionmaking norms that might lead a
policy entrepreneur to file a certiorari petition in a case regardless of whether it presents
facts that are optimal to the policy entrepreneur’s position. For example, a Supreme Court
litigator may wish to file a petition in the first case that creates a circuit split because it is
much more likely that the Court will accept such a case for review. See Nancy Morawetz,
Counterbalancing Distorted Incentives in Supreme Court Pro Bono Practice:
Recommendations for the New Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar and Public Interest Practice
Communities, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 138–45 (2011) (describing certiorari filing pressures
when a circuit split arises). This phenomenon will certainly draw the Court’s attention to
complexities that the policy entrepreneur would otherwise like to conceal. At the same time,
however, the sort of sustained litigation strategy that leads to such circuit splits requires the
sort of financing and resources that typically requires a coordinated “support structure for
legal mobilization.” Epp, supra note 192, at 256. Therefore, the information-disclosing
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However, because criminal procedure litigation is primarily
undertaken by thousands of individual litigants, individual policy
entrepreneurs are unable to filter the information the Court receives.
Consequently, the Court will be presented with a great deal more
information about potential constitutional problems in the criminal justice
system than in other areas of public life, and that information will be
presented with a great deal less care. This, in turn, makes the Court more
aware of the complexities of using constitutional criminal procedure to
regulate criminal justice than other areas of public life, and to feel less
equipped to handle those complexities.
Constitutional criminal procedure, therefore, is not only a field with
complex regulatory dimensions, but one in which the Supreme Court is not
sheltered from that complexity by policy entrepreneurs seeking to frame
their positions in the best possible light. Without the information-filtering
mechanisms that shape the Court’s agenda in other constitutional areas, the
Court is potentially vulnerable to the sort of decisionmaking problems in
criminal procedure cases that scholars typically associate with other, more
explicitly regulatory fields such as administrative and corporate law. 197 The
political economy of criminal procedure litigation may therefore create
overdelegation pressure.
D. REDISTRIBUTIVE RIGHTS

The third feature of constitutional criminal procedure that
differentiates it from most other constitutional law, and incentivizes
overdelegation, is its resemblance to a system of positive rights.
Notwithstanding the oft-repeated shibboleth that the Constitution “is a
charter of negative rather than positive liberties,” 198 a number of criminal
procedure rights require the government to do more than merely forbear
from doing certain things to its citizens. As David Sklansky has argued,
most of the Constitution’s criminal procedure provisions require the
government to affirmatively act, and often to invest considerable resources,
in order to protect its citizens.199 The affirmative nature of some of these
effect of these practices may be diminished because the cases that create a circuit split are
often the ones that policy entrepreneurs chose to litigate in the first instance.
197
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1351–72 (2010) (analyzing decisionmaking failures caused by
the lack of information filters in administrative law).
198
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.
1987), aff’d, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). For classic articles defending this view, see Frank B.
Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001); David P. Currie, Positive
and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
199
David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
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obligations, such as the need to provide indigent criminal defendants with
publicly funded lawyers and a speedy trial, is obvious. 200 However, even
the Fourth Amendment—a right that seems “obviously negative in
character” 201—requires officers to obtain a warrant before conducting most
arrests 202 and for the state to “promptly” provide a judicial assessment of
the grounds of any warrantless arrests.203 Likewise, if government officials
wish to obtain a confession from a suspect, they may either do so in
violation of Miranda (and risk letting the suspect escape conviction), or
invest the resources necessary to ensure that police officers are trained to
comply with Miranda before trying to get a suspect to talk. 204
These obligations place the Court in the unusual position of making
resource-allocation decisions when deciding on the scope of a constitutional
right. The entire enterprise of criminal law, Louis Seidman has argued, can
be viewed as “a form of redistribution,” since it reallocates public money to
“provide protection for those who lack the private resources to protect
themselves, in much the way that social security or welfare reallocates
results reached in private markets.” 205 Within this system, constitutional
protections for suspects and defendants make it more costly for the
government to achieve its aims, and thus increase the redistributive costs of
criminal justice. 206 Granted, the affirmative obligations (and resource
expenditures) imposed by the Constitution’s criminal procedure provisions
are triggered only when the government chooses to act in certain ways
toward the rights-holder, prompting Sklansky to characterize them as
“quasi-affirmative rights” that “occupy a kind of middle ground between
affirmative rights and negative rights.” 207 However, these triggering
actions—including the arrest, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected
crime-doers—are ones that “realistically, the government cannot entirely
forego.” 208 Accordingly, constitutional rules of criminal procedure require
courts to make implicit and, occasionally, explicit decisions about whether
to expand the cost of state and local government.
88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1233–38 (2002).
200
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1238–39.
201
Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1240–41.
202
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1241–42.
203
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
204
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1239–40.
205
Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal
Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2315 (1998) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)).
206
See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2015–17 (2008).
207
Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1234.
208
Id.
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This feature of criminal procedure doctrine creates two incentives for
courts to devolve power to law enforcement officials. First, it increases the
regulatory complexity of the Court’s decisionmaking and thereby tempts
the Court to reflexively delegate authority to law enforcement officials. 209
Specifically, the resource-allocation implications of criminal procedure
create information costs beyond those arising from the regulatory
complexity of governing a vast and heterogeneous population of police and
prosecutors. Moreover, these resource-allocation implications mean that
constitutional criminal procedure rules will tie not only the hands of law
enforcement officials, but also, indirectly, those of the state legislators who
must fund the rights. Criminal procedure cases thus involve budgetary
consequences that may be difficult to foresee and that courts are
institutionally ill equipped to address.
Given these difficulties, Supreme Court Justices may be reluctant to
adopt constitutional decision rules that, as a textual and doctrinal matter,
would be legitimate.210 And because resource-allocation questions are
traditionally within the legislative purview, the Court may overestimate the
states’ ability and willingness to determine how best to fund criminal
procedure rights if they are entrusted to do so through deferential decision
rules. One way for the Court to address this problem is to articulate a
strong constitutional norm, but to adopt a decision rule that gives low-level
officials considerable discretion over how to implement the norm.
Delegation thus allows the Supreme Court to announce a quasi-affirmative
criminal procedure right that theoretically imposes an unfunded mandate on
the states, but gives the states latitude over how generously they wish to
fund it.
Second, beyond any substantive apprehensions that Supreme Court
Justices might have about implementing quasi-affirmative rights, the
institutional role they occupy suggests that they simply may be disinclined
to do so. Because most constitutional guarantees impose limits on
government rather than affirmative obligations,211 judicial review is
typically “more useful for hampering the expansion of government than for
hampering the reduction of government, regardless of any policy
disagreements between the Court and the elected branches.” 212 Therefore,
209

See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1244–92 (arguing that the Court has shied
away from adopting legitimate and sensible doctrinal strategies in criminal procedure cases
because the quasi-affirmative nature of the strategy was particularly salient).
211
See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1579–85 (2000).
212
WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 43–44.
210
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the opportunities that Supreme Court Justices have to enact their policy
preferences through judicial review are usually asymmetric, with those
Justices who wish to set limits on government being much better positioned
than those who wish to aid its expansion. 213 Accordingly, criminal
procedure is one of the few areas of constitutional law that gives Justices
the policy opportunity to grow the government.
However, recent scholarship in behavioral economics and social
psychology suggests two reasons why Supreme Court Justices might not
welcome this policy opportunity. First, the agenda space that judges
occupy is likely to have a selection effect on the type of individuals who are
attracted to the judiciary. 214 A prospective judge (including a prospective
Supreme Court Justice) can expect the Supreme Court’s agenda space to be
devoted largely to the enforcement of core constitutional rights,215 and
absent of the issues that are of greatest national concern at any given
time. 216 This, in turn, means that a person who is ideologically invested in
limiting the size of government might find the judiciary to be a relatively
attractive career, while a person interested in resource-intensive
policymaking will be deterred from it.
Second, notwithstanding their ideological predilections before taking
office, individuals who are appointed to the Supreme Court may cultivate
an aversion to the sort of quasi-affirmative lawmaking that criminal
procedure adjudication requires. This observation is rooted in role theory,
which examines how individuals adopt the behaviors they associate with
whatever organizational role they are expected to play. 217 Drawing upon
213

Id.
See Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV.
953, 966 (2005) (identifying the “opportunity to promote the officeholder’s vision of good
government” as a form of implicit compensation that will affect which individuals are
attracted to the position); cf. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 290, 328 (2010) (suggesting, based on data from a comparative study, that “electoral
judgeships attract and reward politically savvy people, whereas appointed judgeships attract
more professionally able people”).
215
See Cross, supra note 211, at 1579–85.
216
See Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 8–9 (2006).
217
See generally B. J. Biddle, Recent Development in Role Theory, 12 ANN. REV. SOC.
67, 73–74 (1986) (describing “organizational” role theory); id. at 80–81 (describing
scholarship on how individuals shift their behavioral preferences in response to others). For
a recent application of this organizational role theory to explain the development of strict
liability doctrines in American tort law, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long
Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1401
(2010).
214
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this work, political scientists have shown that the institutional role Supreme
Court Justices occupy will not only constrain them from pursuing certain
aims, but may also help determine the aims they wish to pursue.218 Because
the majority of the Supreme Court’s constitutional agenda is devoted to
limiting the actions of government, it is conceivable that a Justice might
come to envision her judicial role exclusively in these terms and become
skeptical of any claims (however doctrinally sound) that the Constitution
imposes affirmative obligations on the government. (Indeed, this view of
the Supreme Court Justice’s role is consistent with the popular assumption
that the Constitution is exclusively a “charter of negative rather than
positive liberties.” 219)
Such a conception of the judicial role may serve to explain what
Sklansky has characterized as the Supreme Court’s reluctance in criminal
procedure cases to pursue doctrinal strategies that impose new obligations
on the government, even when there is a sound constitutional basis for
doing so. 220 More precisely, the institutional norms and incentives that
shape Supreme Court decisionmaking may motivate the Court to shift as
much authority to low-level officials as necessary to avoid imposing a clear
mandate on state governments. Thus, the redistributive nature of criminal
procedure may incentivize the Supreme Court to overdelegate.
IV. OVERDELEGATION CYCLES
The decisionmaking process in constitutional criminal procedure thus
has a number of structural features that, one might hypothesize, give rise to
overdelegation. If this hypothesis is correct, however, it begs the question
why the Supreme Court adopts constitutional rules that constrain law
enforcement officials in the first place. This is, of course, a question that
lacks an easy answer. In thinking about the question, however, it is helpful
to consider similarities that might exist between how the Supreme Court
decides to involve itself in criminal procedure regulation and what
regulation looks like in corporate law. Much like administrative agencies
and common law courts do when regulating market relationships, the
Supreme Court faces a problem of organizing and processing information
when deciding how best to enforce constitutional criminal procedure
rules. 221 It is therefore worth borrowing from the literature of economic and
218

See supra note 129.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.
1987), aff’d, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
220
Sklansky, supra note 199, at 1244–92.
221
See supra Part III.
219
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administrative regulation to examine how these information-processing
problems shape the Supreme Court’s doctrinal choices.
This literature suggests that one effect of the complexity of criminal
procedure decisionmaking is to incentivize judicial delegation at precisely
the times when it might be least warranted. In the context of market
regulation, Neil Komesar has analyzed how different institutions—courts
and the market, in his examination—concurrently become less able to
address problems as those problems become more urgent. Komesar argues
that, in areas of law in which there is little complexity and few disputes,
courts tend to articulate simple, over- and underinclusive rules. 222
However, as problems grow more complex and numerous, nonjudicial
institutions become unable to engage successfully in the sort of balancing
and negotiation that is required to make those rules work. 223 Therefore, a
greater number of disputes will find their way to the courts, and judges will
be pressured to develop increasingly nuanced and context-dependent
standards for resolving those disputes. 224
Such standards, however, create additional labor for courts, which
cannot build their institutional capacity at nearly the same rate at which the
problems they address increase in complexity. 225 Accordingly, as problems
grow even more numerous and complex, judges will have to adopt
strategies that help their institution cope with an increased workload. At
times, a court may once again attempt to issue simple rules in the hope of
making a problem more tractable, but in doing so may risk creating more
disputes (this time about the new rule) that will find their way onto judges’
dockets. Another strategy, however, is for the courts to shift their problems
onto other institutions by deferring to markets and political processes.
Increased numbers and complexity may therefore result in “rules of judicial
abdication produced by the inevitable effect of the demand for judicial
resources outstripping the supply.” 226 Thus, as economic and political
institutions deteriorate in their ability to address conflicts between parties
(thereby causing the parties to turn to courts), judges will be increasingly
tempted to create doctrines that defer to those deteriorating institutions. 227
222

KOMESAR, supra note 131, at 157–58.
Id. at 158.
224
Id. at 158.
225
See Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 959, 968 (1997) (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994)) (“Higher-level
appellate courts . . . cannot expand their capacity to resolve disputes at the same rate as the
economy grows.”).
226
KOMESAR, supra note 131, at 163.
227
Id. at 158.
223
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Accordingly, as problems grow more complex, one may expect to see
courts cycle between strong rules, flexible standards, and deference to other
institutions. 228
This account offers a powerful framework for evaluating how
appellate courts react as a problem grows more complex and numerous, and
recent empirical scholarship suggests that the framework is to some degree
accurate.229 It is an open question, however, whether the framework is
useful for describing doctrinal shifts in constitutional law. While Komesar
posits that constitutional law is subject to judicial cycling between strong
rules and deference to other actors, 230 he does not address the mechanisms
at the Supreme Court’s disposal to reduce its workload without resorting to
judicial abdication. The most important of these mechanisms is the writ of
certiorari, which gives the Court almost complete discretion over its docket
by permitting it to decide which cases to accept for review. 231 Moreover,
for those cases it decides to accept for review, the Court has a range of
interpretive canons, justiciability doctrines, and procedural techniques—
devices that Alexander Bickel famously describes as the “passive virtues”
—which allow it to avoid deciding an issue until it is institutionally better
positioned to do so. 232
The Supreme Court thus has the statutory authority to manage its
agenda without resorting to a strategy of judicial abdication, and has
additionally cultivated a number of adjudicatory techniques to resist the
pressure caused by an increased demand for judicial resources. One might
therefore wonder: if the Court faces extraordinary structural pressure to
228

Id. at 160–61.
See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1127–37 (2011)
(discovering a positive correlation between appellate court deference to district courts in
civil cases and caseload increases in another area of law).
230
KOMESAR, supra note 131, at 161.
231
See O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 745–46 & nn.78–80. In recent years, the Court has
taken advantage of this discretion by reducing its caseload relative to its recent historical
levels. See Donald A. Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure: Crawford in
California, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 349, 361 (2012) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s reduced caseload as a “crude but consequential device” for the Court reducing its
power of direct review in criminal procedure cases).
232
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (1986); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Essay, On Avoiding
Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 677–79 (2012)
(tracing the constitutional avoidance canon’s development); Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 416 (1997) (defining “passive
virtues” as Bickel’s name for “the strategic use by courts (particularly the Supreme Court) of
justiciability doctrines and other procedural techniques to avoid deciding issues the Court
believes are best deferred to a later date”).
229
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delegate authority to law enforcement officials in criminal procedure cases,
why would it regularly decide to take those cases? And, when it does take
them, why does the Court sometimes introduce expansive new
constitutional protections—as the Warren Court did for a range of contexts
and as the Supreme Court has recently done in the Crawford and Booker
lines of cases 233—before later engaging in overdelegation?
Whatever its faults as a general account of the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisionmaking, Komesar’s account of how courts respond to
complexity and volume can, with some modification, shed considerable
light on the trajectory of contemporary criminal procedure doctrine. First,
both the structure and the substance of criminal procedure litigation create
significant pressure for the Supreme Court to intervene in the area and, at
least initially, craft strong constitutional rules. At the structural level, the
Supreme Court has adopted a range of institutional norms that govern its
For example,
decision whether to accept a case for review.234
notwithstanding its apprehensions about grappling with the substance of
certain matters, the Court is likely to accept a case if doing so would resolve
a circuit split, or if an issue has been “percolating” in the lower courts. 235
The extraordinary volume of criminal procedure petitions submitted to the
Court each year ensures that at least some cases will exhibit these
features. 236 Of course, this volume provides the Court’s Justices with an
extraordinary degree of freedom over which case involving a certain issue
to accept for review (because its docket may, for example, include multiple
petitions on an issue on which there is a circuit split).237 However, the
volume will also ensure that that the Court is pressured to review some case
involving that issue.
Moreover, once it has accepted a particular case for review, the
Supreme Court has relatively few procedural tools at its disposal for
avoiding the merits of a constitutional criminal procedure question. The
vast majority of criminal procedure questions on the Court’s docket arise
from cases in which a defendant has been criminally convicted, thus
precluding claims of ripeness, mootness, or standing. Moreover, even if the
Court is able to strategically avoid the merits of a constitutional criminal
233

See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
234
See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 216–70 (1991) (explaining the institutional norms that govern the
Supreme Court’s agenda setting).
235
Id. at 230.
236
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
237
See O’Rourke, supra note 153, at 728–29.
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procedure question in a certain case, the subsidized nature of criminal
procedure litigation will ensure that the issue will keep arising on its docket
again and again until it is resolved. 238
Beyond these structural pressures, the substance of constitutional
criminal procedure further incentivizes the Supreme Court to occasionally
intervene in the criminal justice system by crafting expansive constitutional
protections. As described above, the Court frequently allocates power
between itself and other institutions in criminal procedure cases, which
makes institutional choice analysis a useful descriptive lens for
understanding the doctrine. 239 However, in order to determine which
institution is most competent to address a constitutional problem, the Court
must first make normative choices about what the problem is and how it
should be addressed. 240 One might therefore expect that, on issues that are
particularly normatively fraught, the Supreme Court’s doctrinal choices
may not reflect the outcomes envisioned by institutional choice scholars
who focus only on the “costs” of judicial decisionmaking without inquiring
into the normative assumptions that underpin how those costs are
defined. 241 Because the Constitution’s criminal procedure provisions are
indeterminate with respect to the problems in the contemporary criminal
justice system, 242 criminal procedure has long been normatively
contested. 243 It is, therefore, precisely the sort of morally fraught area of
constitutional law that the Supreme Court perceives, for good historical
reasons, as being within its bailiwick. 244
Moreover, the fact that legislators have historically been inactive on
criminal procedure matters may further incentivize the Court to involve

238

See supra Part III.C.
See supra notes 131–144 and accompanying text.
240
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2053–54
(2006) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra note 152).
241
Cf. id. at 2052–54 (criticizing Adrian Vermeule’s approach to constitutional
interpretation for failing to attend to the normative underpinnings of institutional choice
theory).
242
Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 378 (2007) (arguing that “open[-]ended”
constitutional provisions tend to “invite constitutional decisionmaking that expresses
national ideals”).
243
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 274–77
(2009) (describing the role the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions played in the
1968 presidential election).
244
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 56 (Alexander Hamilton) (on the
judicial correction of wrongs).
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itself in the field.245 Members of the Court may reasonably extrapolate
from such inactivity to conclude (accurately or otherwise) that criminal
procedure is an area in which legislatures cannot be trusted to protect the
This perception makes judicial
rights of criminal defendants. 246
intervention in criminal procedure both more normatively justifiable,
because it does not trespass on the lawmaking prerogatives of a coordinate
branch, and more urgent, because the Court cannot assume that lawmakers
will fill the constitutional void if it fails to intervene.
The structure of criminal procedure litigation thus creates both
strategic and normative pressures for the Supreme Court to act as Komesar
might predict. Before a criminal procedure issue reaches a certain level of
complexity, one may expect the Court to craft expansive constitutional
decision rules to regulate the conduct of low-level officials. These decision
rules will, in turn, create new constitutional conflicts. Because of the
subsidized nature of criminal procedure litigation (and the stakes of that
litigation for individual defendants), these conflicts will be placed on the
Supreme Court’s agenda at an exponentially greater rate than other
constitutional disputes.247 Moreover, because policy entrepreneurs cannot
filter which cases wind up on the Court’s agenda, they cannot shield the
Court from cases that highlight the administrative complexity of the
constitutional rules it has created.248 Over time, the Court’s awareness of
these complexities may shape (or, arguably, distort) its views about which
decision rules are appropriate for implementing the Constitution’s criminal
procedure protections. Thus, as the rules the Court has created start to
generate new conflicts and complexities, the structure of criminal procedure
litigation creates greater institutional pressures for the Court to overdelegate
authority.
V.

AVOIDING OVERDELEGATION

The structure of criminal procedure decisionmaking offers little cause
for optimism that the Supreme Court will consistently make delegation
245

See supra note 29.
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993) (arguing that “legislators undervalue the rights of the
accused for no more sinister, and no more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of
persons, of much greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential
crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant”). But see Kerr, supra
note 29, at 827–37.
247
See supra Part III.C.
248
See supra Part III.C.
246
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choices that are appropriate to its constitutional objectives. By definition,
however, overdelegation is a losing strategy for any court, and judges thus
have a strong incentive to avoid the problem regardless of what their
substantive constitutional objectives may be.
Fortunately, while
overdelegation may be a problem that inheres in the structure of criminal
procedure, it is also one that judges are capable of addressing on a case-bycase basis. This Article has attempted to lay the groundwork for such
judicial efforts by presenting an analytically precise definition of
overdelegation, and by describing both how and why it tends to occur in
criminal procedure cases.249
It is beyond this Article’s scope to offer judges more precise guidance
on how to craft doctrinal rules that avoid overdelegation. Moreover, any
scholarly efforts to provide such guidance should be undertaken with a
healthy dose of modesty. As this Article shows, the optimal delegation
strategy with respect to a judge’s particular constitutional objective is
highly context-specific. It requires the judge to predict what factors might
undermine a doctrinal rule’s effectiveness in implementing a constitutional
objective, and to assess whether law enforcement officials are sufficiently
competent and trustworthy to deviate from a rule when doing so would
better advance that objective. 250 Moreover, once a judge has selected the
optimal level of delegation in a given case, it may require considerable
imagination to construct a doctrinal rule that constrains law enforcement
officials to precisely the degree that the judge intended. 251
The task of crafting an optimal delegation strategy thus requires
exercising the prudential wisdom and “situation sense” that judges can
obtain only through experience and professional habituation. 252 Any
249
To be exact, Part II of this Article describes how overdelegation occurs, and Part III.A
identifies a common reason why it occurs. As to the how: overdelegation arises when judges
(1) underestimate either law enforcement officials’ competence to implement a criminal
procedure rule or their hostility toward the constitutional objective underlying the rule, or (2)
overestimate the extent to which uncertain conditions will require law enforcement officials
to deviate from the criminal procedure in order to better implement its underlying objective.
See supra Part II. As to the why: criminal procedure’s structure can tempt judges to commit
the fallacy of “single institutionalism,” making them so overwhelmed by criminal
procedure’s regulatory complexity (relative to other areas of constitutional law) that they fail
to undertake a comparative institutional analysis before delegating power to law enforcement
officials. See supra Part III.A.
250
See supra Part II.
251
Cf. Berman, supra note 42, at 12 (“As a conceptual matter, the number and variety of
options in the making of constitutional decision rules is limited only by judicial imagination
and by the (ever-changing) constraining norms of professional practice.”).
252
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 59–61
(1960); see also Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and
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doctrinal rules that are proposed without the benefit of such experience, or
that are too abstracted from the empirical realities which must inform a
court’s delegation strategy, are likely to be of limited practical value.
However, this Article’s account of overdelegation in criminal procedure
does point toward a few decisionmaking suggestions that judges and
scholars may wish to explore.
A. ANNOUNCING CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVES

Before deciding how much discretionary authority to delegate to law
enforcement officials, a judge must, of course, decide what constitutional
objective she is seeking to accomplish. This is a normative task that
requires the judge to interpret the scope of the constitutional right in
question. 253 While this Article takes no position on how best to interpret
the Constitution’s criminal procedure provisions, its analysis does highlight
the value of having judges flesh out their interpretations thoroughly, and
articulate them sincerely. 254
Part II of this Article identifies at least two ways that a judge may
overdelegate power to law enforcement officials, only one of which is
identifiable without knowing the judge’s subjective motivations.255 First,
the judge may faithfully articulate a constitutional objective, and then
design a set of doctrinal rules that grant law enforcement officials more
discretionary authority than is appropriate for achieving that objective. 256
Second, the judge may announce a constitutional objective that appears to
conform with the policy preferences of law enforcement officials when she
in fact believes that a different constitutional objective is normatively
preferable. 257
This second, obfuscatory method of overdelegation imposes
particularly high costs in criminal procedure cases, where courts must
regulate the activities of a diverse array of low-level officials.258 In any
adjudicatory context, one of the principal virtues of judicial reason-giving is
Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 77 (2011) (discussing
“situation sense”).
253
See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
254
See generally Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal
Decision Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010) (arguing that both the requirements
of judicial sincerity and its value are context-dependent); Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity
of Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 375 (2011) (defending a robust conception of judicial
sincerity).
255
See supra Part II.
256
See supra Part II.A.
257
See supra Part II.B.
258
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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that it provides guidance to law-abiding officials and citizens about what
the law requires of them. 259 With respect to constitutional criminal
procedure, there will be some law enforcement officials who feel a
normative obligation to comply with the Constitution, even if they lack any
content-independent reasons to do so. 260 By sincerely articulating its view
of a constitutional criminal procedure right’s scope, the Supreme Court
instructs these law-abiding officers about what conduct they must undertake
in order to comply fully with their constitutional obligations.
Of course, the Court must also establish doctrinal rules that regulate
the conduct of ill-motivated law enforcement officers, who believe that they
have no content-dependent reason for obeying whatever rule the Court
imposes. In order to maximize the likelihood that these officers fulfill their
constitutional obligations, the Court must impose a set of doctrinal rules
that places clear constraints on the conduct officers can engage in without
being penalized. For reasons of epistemic uncertainty or administrative
manageability, however, these decision and remedial rules may
underenforce the true scope of a constitutional right.261 If the Court were to
conflate these underenforcing rules of implementation with the scope of the
right itself, it would deprive sincerely motivated actors of the opportunity to
honor their constitutional obligations fully. 262
B. DECIDING WHOM TO REGULATE

American law enforcement is not a monolithic entity. It is composed
of thousands of different institutions, operating in vastly different cultural
contexts under very different resource constraints. 263 Therefore, by
asserting that an optimal delegation strategy requires courts to consider the
competence and policy aims of law enforcement institutions, this Article
raises an obvious question: which law enforcement institutions? Should a
court select its delegation strategy with an eye toward regulating the worst
law enforcement institutions—those most likely to flout the court’s rules?
259
See Cohen, supra note 254, at 1111–15 (discussing consequentialist arguments in
favor of judicial sincerity); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY 214 (1979) (arguing that as a conceptual matter, the law “must be capable of
guiding the behaviour of its subjects . . . [and] must be such that they can find out what it is
and act on it”).
260
See supra notes 165–175 and accompanying text; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35 (1986) (“A reason is content-independent if there is no direct
connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason.”).
261
See Sager, supra note 42, at 1213–21.
262
Cf. Berman, supra note 42, at 87–88 (discussing the obligations of “conscientious
state actors” toward underenforced constitutional rights).
263
See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
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Or should the court instead try to consider some (hypothetical) average law
enforcement institution?
There is no easy answer to this question. Instead, this Article’s
delegation framework suggests that a judge’s normative commitments
should determine which law enforcement institutions’ policy preferences
and capabilities will inform her delegation strategy. This is because the
choice necessarily implicates questions about the federal judiciary’s proper
role in enforcing the Constitution’s criminal procedure guarantees against
the states and against coordinate branches of government. For example, a
judge with a traditional conception of judicial supremacy—according to
which the Constitution simply “means what the Supreme Court says it
means”—may wish to maximize the overall level of law enforcement
compliance with the Court’s constitutional pronouncements. 264 Ideally, in
order to accomplish this goal, the judge might want to determine the
average (mean) level of law enforcement competence and hostility toward a
constitutional guarantee, weighted by the number of occasions on which the
guarantee is implicated.265 This would enable the judge to develop a
delegation strategy that reflects the preferences and abilities of every law
enforcement institution that would be bound by her constitutional
pronouncements.
By trying to measure the overall level of law
enforcement hostility toward a constitutional objective, the judge might be
able to produce a constitutional policy outcome that most closely
approximates her ideal outcome.
By contrast, a judge might think that the federal judiciary should only
seek to reinforce constitutional consensuses that emerge through the
political process, and to use its power to discipline “outliers” from those
consensuses. 266 This theoretical commitment might motivate the judge to
264
Greene, supra note 172, at 888 (describing a view of judicial supremacy that has
come under academic criticism).
265
Implicit in this claim is the assumption that law enforcement officials’ attitudes
toward a court’s constitutional objective can be represented as a set policy of outcomes that,
together with the court’s constitutional objective, can be characterized as points on a onedimensional policy space. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with
Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 839–44
(2010) (defending the explanatory value of one-dimensional judicial decisionmaking
models).
266
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 453 (2004) (arguing that “[m]ore constitutional
law than is commonly supposed reflects th[e] tendency to constitutionalize consensus and
suppress outliers”); Post & Siegel, supra note 242, at 394 & n.103 (suggesting that
Klarman’s thesis could be read as a normative claim that the role of courts is to suppress
outliers and consolidate conclusions reached through the political process); see also David
Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
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limit the scope of a particular constitutional guarantee so that it does not
impose more obligations on most law enforcement institutions than they
have already assumed for themselves. But in selecting the optimal doctrinal
strategy to enforce this guarantee, the judge would not wish to devolve
more discretionary authority than could be entrusted to those law
enforcement officials who are the most hostile to honoring the guarantee,
and to those institutions that are the least competent to honor it. That is, the
judge will consider only the attitudes and competency of “outlier” law
enforcement officials in selecting her optimal delegation point. Thus, the
judge’s normative constitutional theory would lead her to develop a
maximin strategy by attempting to eliminate the worst constitutional
violations. 267
Thus, without fleshing out a richer normative theory of constitutional
interpretation, this Article cannot offer more precise guidance as to whose
motivations and competence a court should consider. For the purposes of
this Article, however, it is sufficient to urge courts to consider some set of
law enforcement institutions’ competence and ideological interests before
deciding whether to devolve discretionary authority away from the
judiciary. Through engaging in such an analysis, courts can escape from
the sort of single-institutional analysis that typically plagues constitutional
criminal procedure decisionmaking.
C. ORDER OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

After setting a constitutional objective, a judge will have to assess the
relative competence of both the court and the law enforcement institutions
that will be charged with implementing that objective. As Part II explains,
this analysis requires the judge to evaluate (1) law enforcement officials’
attitudes toward the court’s constitutional objective and their competence to
implement the objective, and (2) the extent to which conditions of
uncertainty warrant delegation to the officials. For a number of reasons, a
judge would be well advised to undertake these inquiries sequentially,
starting with the assessment of law enforcement motivations and
competence.
157, 222–23 (2012) (“Many of the debates in criminal procedure scholarship over the past
several decades have been about the relative merits of what can be seen as two different
mechanisms of accountability: on the one hand, representative democracy, and on the other,
the rule of law, which in this context has meant judicial protection of constitutional rights.”).
267
See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 919 (2011) (“Maximin, called
maxmin by other scholars, means selecting the strategy that has the least bad worst case
outcome—the decision maker ‘maximizes’ the ‘minimum’ utilities possible across the
strategy space.”).
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First, as an analytical matter, the court will need to go no further in its
comparative institutional analysis if it decides that law enforcement
officials are simply too incompetent or too hostile to the constitutional right
in question to benefit from a doctrinal rule that gives them any meaningful
degree of discretion. Second, as a prudential matter, the problem of
overdelegation typically arises when a judge commits the fallacy of single
institutionalism and decides to devolve authority from her court simply
because she recognizes that it will have difficulty coping with the
complexity of a problem.
By evaluating the competence of law
enforcement officials before assessing the magnitude of these factors, the
judge compensates for this heuristic bias and engages in a more accurate
comparative institutional analysis.
Third, the judge’s assessment of law enforcement officials’ policy
preferences is relevant to how confident she can be in estimating how
conditions of uncertainty might affect her delegation choice. Much of the
information relevant to the uncertainty inquiry is likely to be in the hands of
law enforcement officials. Because these officials stand to gain more
discretionary authority if the judge overestimates the difficulty of crafting
an accurate decision rule, they have an incentive to mislead the judge as to
the scope of what she does not know. 268 As such, the judge must have a
good working estimate of law enforcement officials’ hostility to the right in
question in order to better estimate whether there are factors she does not
know ex ante that might merit devolving authority away from the court.
If the judge is satisfied that law enforcement officials are capable of
responsibly using whatever discretion the court might grant them, she
should then decide whether it is necessary to delegate that discretion so that
the officials can adapt to conditions of uncertainty. This step of the
delegation process is likely to be the one that is the most difficult, and the
least accurate. Granted, when assessing the competence and motivations of
law enforcement officials, a judge may have limited information upon
which to base her analysis. But while this information may be difficult for
a judge to obtain or to assess accurately, it is at least theoretically knowable.
The task of estimating uncertainty, however, forces the judge to assess the
magnitude of what she does not know. Because judges cannot predict the
future, they are not likely to be able to estimate their own institutional
ignorance with any degree of accuracy.
In order to avoid overdelegation, however, it is essential that the judge
not simply throw up her hands when confronted with these difficulties and
delegate authority without reflecting on whether it is truly necessary to do
268

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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so. Instead, the judge must attempt to estimate some sort of plausible upper
limit of how badly a decision rule might fail to serve its background
justification. In this endeavor, the adversarial nature of the litigation
process can help the judge make a sensible prediction. The judge can be
reasonably confident that, as a party to the litigation, the government will
seek to identify all conceivable worst-case scenarios that would justify
delegating authority to them. Likewise, she can be confident that the
defendant will attempt to supply whatever information might cast doubt on
the plausibility of these scenarios. While a judge’s assessment of this
information is unlikely to be perfect—or perhaps even good—her ultimate
delegation choice will be much better for having made the effort.
CONCLUSION
These decisionmaking suggestions may go some way toward
ameliorating the problem of overdelegation.
But, ultimately,
overdelegation is unlikely to be eliminated without rethinking the normative
and structural foundations of criminal procedure decisionmaking.
However, between radically restructuring the constitutional law of criminal
procedure and encouraging individual judges to take greater care in their
delegation choices, there are other possibilities worth serious exploration.
For example, the Supreme Court could set its criminal procedure agenda in
ways that are likely to provide it with more information about the
competence and attitudes of law enforcement officials with regard to the
Constitution’s criminal procedure guarantees. Instead of granting certiorari
on cases involving relatively well-trained federal officers, the Court could
take cases involving law enforcement officials who are less disposed to
honor a criminal suspect’s criminal procedure rights. 269 Alternatively, the
Court could permit class action habeas corpus actions that would allow
criminal defendants to pool information about the practices of a range of
law enforcement officials. 270
These modest reforms could potentially make the consequences of
overdelegation more salient to the Supreme Court. Ultimately, however,
the core aim of this Article is not reparative; it is diagnostic. By framing
criminal procedure decisionmaking as a delegation process, it is possible to
disentangle the normative questions that preoccupy much of the criminal
procedure scholarship from often-overlooked institutional questions. Thus,
269

Cf. Shay & Lasch, supra note 190, at 249–50 (observing that a disproportionately
large number of criminal certiorari petitions involve federal cases).
270
See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 402–04
(2007) (discussing class action habeas petitions).
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by presenting a new conceptual vocabulary for understanding criminal
procedure cases, this Article aims to deepen our understanding of a
doctrinally peculiar area of constitutional law.

